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The objectives of this study were to adapt a version of the Multiple 
Errands Test for people with intellectual disability and assess the degree to 
which it correlates with other measures of the Supervisory Attentional 
System, including the Tower of London Test, the Six Parts Test and the 
Dysexecutive Questionnaire. The study used a cross sectional correlational 
design with a single sample of 40 participants attending day centres for 
people with intellectual disabilities. The British Picture Vocabulary Scales – 
Third Edition, and the Word Reading subtest from the Wechsler Individual 
Attainment Test – Second Edition, were used to control for the potentially 
confounding effects of receptive vocabulary and reading ability on Multiple 
Errands Test performance. Results showed that ability to successfully 
complete tasks on the adapted Multiple Errands Test correlated significantly 
with the Tower of London Test. However, the adapted Multiple Errands Test 
failed to correlate significantly with the Six Parts test and the Dysexecutive 
Questionnaire. Also, performance on the adapted Multiple Errands Test was 
significantly related to receptive vocabulary, reading ability, and verbal IQ. 
The results suggest that the adapted Multiple Errands Test used here may 
expose impairment in the spontaneous schema generation, goal setting and 
adoption of processing mode (problem solving) functions of the Supervisory 
Attentional System in people with intellectual disabilities. This suggests that 
therapies aimed at remediating these deficits, such as Goal Management 
Training or Problem Solving Therapy, may help people with intellectual 
disabilities manage problems in executive function. However, it is concluded 
that the Multiple Errands Test used here needs further adaptation. 
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This introductory chapter presents the argument for the need to 
develop ecologically valid measures of executive function for people with 
intellectual disability (ID). Initially, a definition of executive function is given 
followed by a review of the relevant neuro-anatomical areas that are 
regarded as supporting executive functions. The functional and/or 
behavioural effects of deficits in executive function are then considered prior 
to an evaluation of three theoretical models. A critical discussion of traditional 
measures of executive function used to test these models is then presented 
followed by the argument that new measures need to be developed which 
can demonstrate ecological validity. The applicability of these models and 
measures for people with ID is then considered. An argument is proposed 
which supports the view that one particular measure may be a useful tool for 
assessing everyday functional and/or behavioural deficits observed in people 
with ID that could plausibly be attributed to deficits in executive function. 
Finally, the argument is reviewed and the aims of the study and research 
hypotheses are presented. 
 
1.2 Defining Executive Function 
 
Despite the frequency with which the term “executive function” is used 
within the neuropsychological literature, a unified definition is yet to be 
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established (Jurado & Rosselli, 2007). For example, Spreen and Strauss 
(1998) described executive function as “a shorthand description of a 
multidimensional construct referring to a variety of loosely related higher 
order cognitive processes including initiation, planning, hypothesis 
generation, cognitive flexibility, decision making, regulation, judgement, 
feedback utilisation and self perception” (p. 171). Alternately,  
Burgess (2010) described executive function as “at the most basic level ... 
the abilities that enable a person to establish new behaviour patterns, and 
ways of thinking and to introspect upon them” (p. 349). At least at face value, 
these definitions appear to have only marginal common ground. This may, in 
part, stem from the debates ongoing within the executive function literature. 
For example, different perspectives exist concerning whether one underlying 
ability is responsible for performance on all executive tasks (e.g., Duncan, 
1995), or whether executive functions are a set of fractionated abilities that 
can be impaired in isolation (e.g., Shallice & Burgess, 1996). This is also 
likely to be influenced by the way in which executive function has been 
measured, which has ranged from highly controlled and abstract, laboratory 
based experimental procedures (Demakis, 2003, 2004) to assessing people 
shopping in a supermarket (Alderman, Burgess, Knight, & Henman, 2003). 
These issues have led Jurado and Rosselli (2007) to conclude that there is 
currently no clear agreement on what executive functions actually are. 
However, for the purposes of this study, the following definition of executive 
function offered by Oscar-Berman and Marinković (2007) is adopted. This 
describes executive function as: 
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“human qualities, including self awareness, that allow us to be 
independent individuals with purpose and foresight about what we do 
and how we behave. For example, executive abilities include 
judgement, problem solving, decision-making, and social conduct, and 
they allow us to monitor and change behaviour flexibly and in accord 
with internal goals and contextual demands” (p. 246). 
This definition is employed as it combines both a descriptive account 
of some of the core cognitive processes that are regarded as falling under 
the banner of executive functions (e.g., self awareness, judgement, 
monitoring behaviour, problem solving and decision-making) as well as the 
behavioural functions that these cognitive processes serve (e.g., being 
independent, acting with purpose and foresight, social conduct, adapting to 
internal goals and contextual requirements). The neuro-anatomical regions 
that are regarded as supporting executive functions are now discussed. 
 
1.3 Correlating Executive Functions with the Anatomy of the Brain 
 
Much evidence has propelled the view that the frontal lobes are the 
regions of the brain in which the neuro-anatomical structures responsible for 
executive processes are located, leading many neuropsychologists to use 
the terms “frontal” and executive interchangeably (Baddeley, Della Sala, 
Gray, Papagno, & Spinnler, 1997). This evidence is largely based on the 
practice of measuring people with frontal lobe damage on tests that 
seemingly tap executive processes. For example, Demakis (2003, 2004) 
undertook two meta analyses comparing performance on four plausibly 
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executive tests including the Wisconsin Card Sort Test (WCST; Heaton, 
Chelune, Talley, Kay, & Curtiss, 1993), the Categories Test (Benton, 
Hamsher, & Sivan, 1978), the Stroop Test (Stroop, 1935) and the Trail 
Making Test (Jarvis & Barth, 1984) in people with frontal and non-frontal lobe 
brain damage. Demakis found significant effect sizes differentiating poorer 
performance on the WCST, the Stroop Test and part A of the Trail Making 
Test in those with frontal lobe damage. 
 The weight of this evidence, and a wide body of corroborating 
research, clearly demonstrate that the frontal lobes have a vital role to play in 
executive functions (Stuss & Alexander, 2007; Stuss & Benson, 1984). 
Whilst accepting the value of the information gained from this approach, 
others have warned against the practice of correlating anatomical regions 
with cognitive function. For example, whilst Baddeley (1996) accepted that 
the frontal lobes are involved in executive functions, he outlines that other 
regions of the brain are also likely to play key roles in performance on 
executive tasks. Indeed, Baddeley et al. (1997) suggested that the distinction 
between frontal and non frontal tests is more a matter of degree than a true 
dichotomy, as it would be very difficult to design an experiment sensitive to 
only executive processes which do not tap areas such as language and 
perception. Moreover, whilst some studies have found consistently poor 
performance by people with frontal lobe lesions on executive tests (Burgess 
& Shallice, 1996a), impaired performance on the same tests can occur in 
those with brain damage outside of the frontal regions and even in 
neurologically healthy controls (Andrés & Van der Linden, 2001; Burgess & 
Alderman, 2004). Indeed, Burgess and Alderman (2004) described how a 
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test score can only indicate a functional impairment that is associated with 
brain damage, not the biophysical state of a particular part of the brain. 
Furthermore, at least at the case study level, considerable damage to the 
frontal lobes as indicated by neuro-imaging can have a limited effect on 
neuro-behavioural test performance, whereas poor neuro-behavioural test 
performance can occur in the context of limited visible frontal lobe damage 
(Bigler, 2001). Moreover, Duncan, Emslie, Williams, Johnson, and Freer 
(1996) stated that caution must be exercised in assuming that poor test 
performance after brain damage is synchronous with the same functions that 
are measured when the test is undertaken by people from the normal 
population. Indeed, such tests may actually be measuring how humans 
perform on tests after brain damage, rather than impairment to the specific 
function that the damaged area purportedly performs.  
In sum, the difficulty with the correlational approach is that correlation 
does not imply causation. That is, just because someone with frontal lobe 
damage performs poorly on a test of executive function, it does not 
necessarily mean that the two are causally related. Bearing this in mind, 
Baddeley et al. (1997) suggested that theoretical models of executive 
function offer a useful alternative to anatomical localisation as such models 
can be manipulated and tested experimentally rather than just sampled (as 
per the correlational approach). Several theoretical models of executive 
function are discussed in section 1.5. However, in order to help the models 
be interpreted and understood more adequately, it is useful to offer a prior 
explanation of how executive function impairment can manifest in an 




1.4 The Clinical Presentation of the Dysexecutive Syndrome 
 
The behavioural presentation of people with deficits in executive 
function following frontal lobe damage has long been documented. For 
example, Rylander (1939) described such patients as experiencing 
“disturbed attention, increased distractibility, a difficulty in grasping the whole 
of a complicated set of affairs ... well able to work along old lines (but) cannot 
learn to master new types of tasks” (p. 22). Furthermore, Penfield and Evans 
(1935) described a patient who, after a frontal lobectomy, observed that: 
“She had planned to get a simple supper for one guest (WP) and four 
members of her family ... when the appointed hour arrived, the food 
was all there, one or two things were on the stove, but the salad was 
not ready, the meat had not been started and she was distressed and 
confused by her long continued effort alone ... she had become 
incapable of discerning for herself possible courses of action so that 
she might choose. If others presented the possibilities she made up 
her mind quite easily” (p. 131). 
The cluster of functional problems that were experienced by the 
people in the examples above was traditionally defined as “frontal lobe 
syndrome”. However, Baddeley and Wilson (1988) subsequently proposed 
that a more appropriate term might be “dysexecutive syndrome”. This 
change in terminology represented a move away from the anatomical 
approach, to begin to describe the difficulties observed in people with frontal 
lobe damage in terms of functional impairment, as opposed to anatomical 
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localisation. This was considered more useful to the practising clinician, who, 
with an understanding of impairment in functional or behavioural terms, is 
then much better placed to deliver interventions to help remediate the 
observed deficit(s).  
 In order to define the symptoms of the dysexecutive syndrome further, 
Burgess, Alderman, Wilson, Evans, and Emslie (1996) drew upon work by 
Stuss and Benson (1984) to develop the Dysexecutive Questionnaire (DEX). 
This samples four broad areas of likely problems that typically accompany 
frontal lobe impairment across the domains of emotion/personality, 
motivation, behaviour and cognition (Wilson, Evans, Emslie, Alderman, & 































Table 1.1  
 
Characteristics of the dysexecutive syndrome as measured by the DEX 
questionnaire 
Question Characteristic assessed 
1. Abstract thinking problems 
2. Impulsivity 
3. Confabulation 
4. Planning problems 
5. Euphoria 
6. Temporal sequencing problems 
7. Lack of insight and social awareness 
8. Apathy and lack of drive 
9. Disinhibition 
10. Variable motivation 
11. Shallowing of affective responses 
12. Aggression 
13. Lack of concern 
14. Preservation 
15. Restlessness-hyperkinesis 
16. Inability to inhibit responses 
17. Knowing-doing dissociation 
18. Distractibility 
19. Poor decision making ability 
20. No concern for social rules 
Note. Adapted from “The Ecological Validity of Tests of Executive Function,” 
by P.W. Burgess, N. Alderman, J. Evans, H. Emslie and B. A. Wilson, 1998, 
Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society, 4, p. 549. Copyright 
1998 by Cambridge University Press.  
 
Whilst these features have been found in mixed aetiology neurological 
samples (Burgess, Alderman, Evans, Emsile, & Wilson, 1998), their 
presence in “normal” populations has also been observed (Chan, 2001). This 
suggests that the dysexecutive syndrome may be a matter of degree rather 
than a pathological entity, and that theoretical models of executive function 
may have much to offer the practising clinician in terms of understanding, 
formulating and providing interventions for a range of different clinical 
presentations which may present with seemingly dysexecutive symptoms. 




1.5 Theoretical Models of Executive Function 
 
Whilst, a review of every model of executive function is beyond the 
scope of this project, three models were selected here on the basis of their 
relevance to the studies objectives. The interested reader is advised to 
consult Burgess and Robertson (2002) and Chan, Shum, Toulopolou, and 
Chen (2008) for more information about the different models of executive 
function.  
 
1.5.1  Duncan’s goal neglect theory. 
 
Duncan’s goal neglect theory (Duncan, 1986, 1995; Duncan, Burgess, 
& Emslie, 1995; Duncan et al., 1996; Duncan et al., 2008; Duncan, Johnson, 
Swales, & Freer, 1997) is based upon the importance of goal setting in 
human behaviour. Here, Duncan suggested that all human behaviours are 
goal-directed. Achieving these goals is dependent upon the ability to create 
smaller lists of goals or sub-goals. Therefore, when an individual’s 
circumstances are experienced as sub-optimal (e.g., when experiencing 
hunger), a set of actions are internally developed or consulted to help bring 
the individual closer to their desired end state (e.g., relieving hunger by 
making a sandwich). However, actions incompatible with goal attainment can 
sometimes be activated by seemingly irrelevant or competing events (e.g., 
an important letter arrives whilst the sandwich is being made). The use of 
sub-goals therefore helps to impose some structure upon how the main 
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goals are achieved and assists in inhibiting competing goals and activating 
relevant ones (e.g., eating the sandwich first and then reading the letter).  
Duncan et al. (1996) further outlined how the commission of goal 
directed behaviour is largely regulated by the frontal lobes and suggested 
that many of the difficulties associated with frontal lobe damage can be 
accounted for by a single process referred to as goal neglect, or the 
“disregard of a task requirement even though it has been understood and 
remembered” (p. 257, Duncan et al., 1996). Duncan et al. (1996) also 
suggested that goal neglect and frontal lobe function(s) are strongly related 
to an individual’s level of “g” or “general intelligence” (Spearman, 1927). 
Duncan et al. (1995) defined g as “a person’s overall tendency to perform a 
task well or less well” (p. 262), and suggested that when a battery of diverse 
ability tests is administered to a large enough sample of people, a matrix of 
generally positive correlations will occur. Accordingly, Duncan et al. (1996) 
suggested that an underlying g factor is “the (hypothetical) factor responsible 
for broad positive correlations” on neuropsychological tests (p. 258) and, 
indeed, measures of executive function. 
Duncan et al. (1995, 1996) stated that this contradicts the 
conventional view that executive functions are not related to psychometric 
“intelligence” (e.g., Eslinger & Damasio, 1985; Shallice & Burgess, 1991; 
Teuber, 1972; Warrington, James, & Maciejewski, 1985). Rather, Duncan et 
al. suggested that this view has come about due to problems in the way g 
has been specified and measured. Accordingly, they suggest that the 
concept of g is better related to that of fluid intelligence. Fluid intelligence is 
implicated in novel problem solving and is generally regarded as being 
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assessed by tests such as Raven’s Progressive Matrices (Raven, Court, & 
Raven, 1998) or Cattell’s Culture Fair test (Institute for Personality and Ability 
Testing, 1973). Alternately, crystalised intelligence is regarded as knowledge 
that can be learned and is relatively insensitive to change. This is measured 
by tests such the National Adult Reading Test (Nelson, 1982), which is 
typically used to assess predicted premorbid IQ in people with dementia or 
brain injuries. 
In support of their claims, Duncan et al. (1995) presented data from 
three patients who had cognitive deficits following frontal lobe lesions, but 
scored in the superior range on IQ tests. They measured these participants 
on Cattell’s Culture Fair test to assess fluid intelligence. Two participants 
were also assessed on the seven sub test short form of the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale (WAIS; Wechsler, 1955) and one participant on the 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Revised (WAIS-R; Wechsler, 1981) to 
measure crystallised intelligence. They found that whilst the participants with 
frontal lobe lesions had superior WAIS/WAIS-R IQ scores, comparable to 
those of neurologically healthy matched controls, the Cattell’s Culture Fair 
test scores of those with frontal lobe lesions were 23-60 IQ points lower. 
Moreover, the discrepancies between WAIS/WAIS-R IQ and Culture Fair IQ 
were absent in five participants with brain lesions outside of the frontal lobe. 
Accordingly, because the participants with frontal lobe damage scored much 
more poorly on Cattell’s Culture Fair test, they suggested that fluid 
intelligence or g is located in the frontal lobes. 
Whilst the above study provides tentative evidence, the sample is 
small and the use of two different tests to measure crystalised intelligence 
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(e.g., WAIS and WAIS-R) complicates the comparisons. It also makes no 
reference to goal neglect. Accordingly, Duncan et al. (1996) went onto 
investigate this further and relate the findings to goal neglect by using a letter 
monitoring task in which healthy participants were required to watch a 
particular side of a computer screen and read out the letters (but not the 
numbers) that appeared on that side. Occasionally, a prompt appeared 
asking the participants to switch sides. Of 90 neurologically healthy 
participants, 15 neglected this prompt (or as the authors suggested displayed 
goal neglect), despite understanding and remembering the prompt’s 
requirements. These 15 people all scored one standard deviation below the 
mean on Cattell’s Culture Fair test (a measure of fluid intelligence). This 
observation was replicated in a subsequent experiment using a sample of 41 
elderly participants, aged between 60 and 70, whose mean Cattell’s Culture 
Fair test score was biased towards a lower level of g. Here, low scores on 
Cattell’s Culture Fair test were associated with poor performance on the 
letter monitoring (goal neglect) task (r = .52). In contrast, correlations 
between the letter monitoring (goal neglect) task and two measures of 
crystallised intelligence; the Mill Hill Vocabulary Scale (Raven et al., 1988) 
and the Nelson-Denny reading comprehension test (Brown, Nelson, & 
Denny, 1976), were lower (r = .02 and .30 respectively) suggesting that goal 
neglect was not related to crystallised intelligence in this sample but more 
closely linked with fluid intelligence. They also repeated these measures in 
10 participants with frontal lobe lesions and 8 participants with posterior 
lesions, each with matched controls. They found no significant difference 
between fluid intelligence in those with posterior lesions and controls (p = 
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0.8) but a significant difference between fluid intelligence in those with frontal 
lobe lesions and controls, with the participants with frontal lobe lesions 
showing worse performance (p < .005). Equally, on the letter monitoring 
(goal neglect) task there was a significant difference between participants 
with frontal lobe lesions and matched controls (p < .005) with complete 
neglect being shown by 7/10 participants with frontal lobe lesions and only 
one control. In contrast, there was an identical mean score between the 
posterior group and matched controls. Participants with frontal lobe lesions 
also scored significantly worse on the letter monitoring (goal neglect) task 
than participants with posterior lesions (p < .02). From this Duncan et al. 
(1996) suggested that both g and goal neglect were located in the frontal 
lobes. 
 Whilst these studies aim to provide some support for the theory that 
fluid intelligence or g is related to the function of the frontal lobes, across 
both studies only 14 participants with frontal lobe lesions actually took part. 
These small samples therefore make it difficult to generalise firm conclusions 
about the specific role of the frontal lobes in plausibly executive tasks, or fluid 
intelligence. Also, the study did not use any alternate tests of executive 
function so inferences about how much g or fluid intelligence actually 
contributes to executive function are difficult to draw. Therefore, Duncan et 
al. (1997) investigated these issues in a much wider sample of 90 brain 
injured participants. Here, they administered four tests traditionally 
considered to measure executive function. These included the Modified 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test MWCST (Nelson, 1976), a verbal fluency test 
(Benton, 1968), a list learning task (Luria, 1966) and a spatial puzzle (Luria, 
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1966). They also administered five measures designed to tap areas 
unrelated to executive function. These included tests of Recognition Memory 
(Warrington, 1984), Digit Span (Wechsler & Stone, 1945), Object Naming 
(McKenna & Warrington, 1983), Recognition of Objects from Unusual Views 
(Warrington & Taylor, 1983) and Motor Speed (Annett, Hudson, & Turner, 
1974). In the brain injured participants, correlational analysis showed that 
there were generally positive relationships between performance on the 
executive tests (between r = .17 and r = .34). However, the median 
correlation between these measures was small (r = .26) and was very similar 
to the median correlation between the executive tests and tests of non 
executive ability (r = .29). From this they suggested that such traditional 
executive tests were not strong measures of any stable underlying cognitive 
characteristic. Therefore, in a second study, Duncan et al. (1997) asked 24 
of the above participants to complete a measure of fluid intelligence (Cattell’s 
Culture Fair Test), the letter sequencing (goal neglect) test described above 
(Duncan et al., 1996), five plausibly executive tests, including a Verbal 
Fluency Test (Benton, 1968), Self Ordered Memory Test (Petrides & Milner, 
1982), the Six Element test (Burgess et al. 1996), Tone Counting (Wilkins, 
Shallice, & McCarthy, 1987) and Reversal of Ambiguous Drawings (Ricci & 
Blundo, 1990) and two non executive tests including Recognition Memory 
(Warrington, 1984) and Digit Span (Wechsler, 1987). They found that the 
median correlation between the executive tests was low (r = .04) whereas 
the median correlation between the executive and non executive tests was 
medium (r = .38). Nevertheless, when correlations between all the tests were 
calculated, with fluid intelligence partilalled out, the correlation disappeared (r 
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= .04). Duncan et al. used this to suggest that little in common exists 
between these tests aside from their g or fluid intelligence component. 
Furthermore, a composite index derived from the executive tests correlated 
with fluid intelligence (r = .59) and goal neglect (r = .72). Duncan et al. 
therefore suggested that fluid intelligence and goal neglect are the factors 
underlying performance on executive tests.  
Despite this, a correlation matrix between the severity of lesion in 24 
brain injured participants across either frontal, temporal or parietal lobes (as 
rated on a scale of 0 - 4 by one of the researchers following examination of 
MRI scans), when correlated with the executive function, fluid intelligence 
and goal neglect scores, revealed generally low scores (ranging from r = -.03 
to r = .36) and there is no mention of how many of the 24 brain injured 
participants had exclusively frontal, temporal or parietal lobe damage. These 
factors make conclusions about the specific relationship that g or goal 
neglect has to the frontal lobes (relative to other brain regions) tentative.  
Equally, the measures used to assess goal neglect (Duncan et al. 
1996, 1997) have been controlled experimental procedures that relate poorly 
to how goal attainment might be required in everyday life. For example, it is 
difficult to infer how reading letters from an alternate side of a computer 
screen might be related to formulating goals in the “real world”. This limits the 
extent to which inferences can be supported about how goal neglect 
phenomena might occur outside of the laboratory. 
Furthermore, whilst it has been suggested that tests such as Raven’s 
Progressive Matrices or Cattell’s Culture Fair test are measures of fluid 
intelligence or novel problem solving ability (Ducan et al., 1995), Wilson, 
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Evans, Emslie, Alderman, and Burgess (1998) suggest that “one of the 
critical aspects for measuring the dysexecutive syndrome is novelty” (p. 221). 
Thus, the skills required in good performance on novel tests such as those 
designed to tap executive function or fluid intelligence may not be entirely 
separate concepts. Indeed, Blair (2006) proposed that fluid intelligence, 
working memory and executive function form a unitary construct called fluid 
cognition and Kane and Engle (2002) have proposed “WM capacity, or the 
capability for executive attention, as the psychological core of the statistical 
construct of general fluid intelligence” (p. 638). Thus, some might consider 
Raven’s Progressive Matrices or Cattell’s Culture Fair test measures of 
executive function themselves, rather than fluid intelligence. 
Despite these criticisms, the theory of goal neglect has stimulated 
research focused on the straightforward rehabilitative implications that it 
offers for goal setting in real life. Accordingly, Levine et al. (2000) used 
Robertson’s (1996) Goal Management Training (GMT; a rehabilitation 
method based on Duncan’s goal neglect theory) designed to assist people 
who present with difficulties in developing appropriate goals and sub-goals to 
learn the steps required to achieve set tasks. Levine et al. randomised 30 
participants with brain injuries into either GMT or motor skills training (MST; 
training in processes unrelated to goal management) and assessed them on 
a series of “everyday” pencil and paper tasks (including marking words when 
proofreading, grouping items on a checklist and answering questions by 
making reference to a grid where the answers could be deciphered) both 
before and after the training. The GMT group showed significantly improved 
accuracy and took more time over the tasks than the MST group. They also 
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described a case study in which GMT was found to be successful at 
improving the meal preparation skills of a participant with encephalitis. Whilst 
this is promising, there was a lack of evidence to suggest that GMT 
generalised to skills outside of the laboratory and no follow up was carried 
out to assess maintenance. Moreover, no matched control was employed in 
the single case study. Indeed, it is likely that this type of intervention would 
only be applicable to a specific sub group of brain damaged people 
motivated to complete the training and whose executive impairment was 
predominantly related to goal neglect. 
Nevertheless, Burgess and Robertson (2002) outline a number of 
difficulties that underlie theories (such as Duncan’s goal neglect) which try to 
explain executive function as deriving from one single underlying factor. 
Initially, they suggest that, in group studies of either neurological or healthy 
samples, the correlations between executive tests are typically very low 
(Miyake et al. 2000; Robbins, 1998). Whilst Duncan’s argument is based on 
this finding (e.g., Duncan et al., 1997) an alternate perspective is that if one 
single factor were responsible for performance on all executive tasks (such 
as g or goal neglect), then these correlations might be expected to be much 
higher. Moreover, as executive function is such a multifaceted construct, 
different measures may tap different aspects of executive function 
respectively. For example, Verbal Fluency tests are regarded as measuring 
verbal production and the WCST is regarded as assessing switching or 
perseveration (Chan et al., 2008). With such a diversity of functions 
considered under the construct of executive function it is perhaps 
unsurprising that the correlations are low. Indeed, Miyake et al. (2000) used 
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structural equation modelling to confirm that three often postulated executive 
functions including inhibition, shifting and updating contribute differentially to 
performance on separate executive tasks. Later, Friedman et al. (2006) also 
found that different aspects of intelligence correlate with these different 
aspects of executive function respectively. For example, in comparing 
measures of fluid intelligence, crystallised intelligence and the Wechsler 
Adult Scale of Intelligence – Third Edition (WAIS-III; Wechsler, 1998) with 
measures of inhibiting, shifting and updating in a neurologically healthy 
sample, they found that updating was highly correlated with all the 
intelligence measures, whereas inhibiting and shifting were not. Thus, there 
may be a much more complex relationship between the different aspects of 
executive function and intelligence than that proposed by Duncan.  
Equally, Stuss and Alexander (2007) suggest that, rather than there 
being one underlying single factor contributing to general performance on 
executive tests, there are alternately three separable and distinct frontal 
attentional processes.  Here, they outlined data from both 
neuropsychological test performance and functional imaging in those with 
frontal lobe lesions to identify energization, task setting and monitoring. 
Specifically, energization is proposed to be located in the superior medial 
region of the frontal lobes, task setting is positioned in the left lateral area 
and monitoring is associated with the right lateral region. This suggests a 
broader range of frontal lobe functions may exist as opposed to just one 
(e.g., goal neglect). 
 A further problem with Duncan’s theory of goal neglect (albeit with the 
previous paragraph in mind) is the supposition that goal neglect and g are 
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specifically located in the frontal lobes. As outlined above, poor performance 
on measures of executive function could occur for a range of reasons that 
are not necessarily related to frontal lobe function (Baddeley et al. 1997). 
These issues are equally compounded by Baddeley’s (1996) suggestion that 
the idea of all executive functions being accounted for through a single 
underlying factor replaces one problem with another. That is, it is not clear 
what the true nature of g itself is, as most measures of intelligence sample a 
range of different skills which themselves are likely to tap a number of 
processes. Indeed, Duncan et al., (1996) suggest that the concept of g is 
itself, poorly specified or “abstract” (p. 258).  
Overall, therefore whilst the strengths of Duncan’s theory of goal 
neglect may be its parsimony, clearly the different abilities tapped by different 
executive measures and the range of anatomical correlates that they might 
plausibly relate to, make this theory open to criticism. This therefore paves 
the way for alternative theories of executive function, which have attempted 
to define executive function in more fractionated terms. 
 
1.5.2   Baddeley’s central executive. 
 
The concept of the central executive derived from investigations into 
working memory. Working memory has been defined as “the system for the 
temporary maintenance and manipulation of information” (Baddeley et al., 
1997) and has been perhaps most significantly influenced by Baddeley and 
Hitch’s (1974) working memory model (see also Baddeley, 1986, 2001). 
Baddeley (2001) proposed that working memory comprises four 
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mechanisms: a phonological loop which stores auditory information, a visuo-
spatial sketchpad which stores visual information, an episodic buffer which 
acts as a general storage system that combines several different kinds of 
information and a central executive which resembles attention and deals with 
cognitively demanding tasks. It is the central executive that is most relevant 
to the field of executive function. Baddeley et al. (1997) suggested that the 
central executive coordinates the operation of its slave systems (the 
phonological loop and visuo-spatial sketchpad), acting as a general 
attentional resource involved in reasoning, decision making, calculation and 
long and short term information retention. Baddeley (1996) outlined the four 
functions of the central executive as (a) switching the retrieval of plans, (b) 
timesharing on dual task activities, (c) selectively attending to certain stimuli 
whilst ignoring others and (d) temporality holding and activating information 
from long term memory. 
 The central executive has perhaps been most extensively tested using 
dual task methodology (Baddeley et al., 1997; Della Sala, Foley, Beschin, 
Allerhand, & Logie, 2010). This follows the premise that if the central 
executive is responsible for commissioning the function of the phonological 
loop and visuo-spatial sketchpad, performance of two concurrent tasks that 
tap these slave systems simultaneously should result in impaired task 
performance (relative to when the tasks are performed individually) due to 
increased load on the attentional resources of the central executive. 
Accordingly, based on research that people with Alzheimer’s disease 
demonstrate a unique profile of performance on verbal and visuo-spatial 
memory span tasks that differed from people with amnesia or head injury 
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(Spinnler, Della Sala, Bandera, & Baddeley, 1988; Wilson, Baker, Fox, & 
Kaszniak, 1983), Baddeley’s working memory model was used as a 
framework to formulate this neuropsychological profile. In an early study, 
Baddeley, Logie, Bressi, Della Sala, and Spinnler (1986) asked 28 
participants with Alzheimer’s disease, 28 age and education matched 
controls and 20 “young” controls to undertake a computer based “pursuit 
tracking” task which was assumed to depend primarily on the visuo-spatial 
sketchpad. Once performance on the tracking task was established, 
participants were then asked to perform the original tracking task again, 
whilst simultaneously performing a secondary task. There were three 
secondary tasks including, (a) an articulatory suppression task where the 
participant was asked to count from one to five repeatedly at a rate of twice 
per second, presumed as relying primarily on the articulatory loop, (b) a 
reaction time to a tone task, where participants pushed a foot pedal in 
response to an auditory tone which was thought to place demands on 
attentional capacity (e.g., the resources of the central executive) and (c) a 
digit span task where the participant was asked to repeat different series of 
digits that increased in length, which purportedly made demands on both the 
central executive and the articulatory loop. Baddeley et al., hypothesised that 
performance on the original tracking task would become impaired if it were 
accompanied by the simultaneous performance of a secondary task and that 
this impairment would be greater for those with Alzheimer’s disease 
compared to both age and education matched and young controls. 
Analysis of variance for the primary tracking task showed that there 
was no main effect of group (e.g., Alzheimer’s disease sufferers, elderly 
30 
 
matched controls and young controls) on the primary tracking task 
performance, when performed without a secondary task, suggesting that all 
groups had comparable scores on this measure, F < 1. However, when the 
primary tracking task was combined with the secondary articulatory 
suppression task, there was a difference in tracking task scores across 
groups, F(1, 54) = 4.71, p < 0.05. Here, the young controls scored better 
than the Alzheimer’s group, who actually scored slightly better than the 
elderly controls. However, there was no interaction effect between group 
(e.g., Alzhiermer’s disease sufferers, elderly controls and young controls) 
and condition (e.g., tracking alone and tracking plus articulatory 
suppression), F < 1, suggesting that, for this condition, the decrement in 
tracking performance (when combined with articulatory suppression) was not 
dependent on whether the participants had Alzheimer’s disease or not. 
For the reaction time to tone condition, analysis of variance, as before, 
replicated the non significant differences between primary tracking task 
performances, when performed without a concurrent secondary task, across 
the groups, F < 1. However, when the primary tracking task was combined 
with the reaction time to tones task, there was a significant main effect of 
group (e.g., Alzhiermer’s disease sufferers, elderly controls and young 
controls), F(1, 54) = 23.53, p < .001. There was also a significant interaction 
between group and condition (e.g., tracking alone and tracking plus reaction 
time to tones), F(1, 54) = 6.13, p < .05. This suggests that each group’s 
tracking performance was affected differently by the addition of the 
secondary reaction time to tones task. Here, the participants with Alzheimer’s 
disease showed worse tracking performance than the elderly controls, and 
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both these groups showed worse tracking performance than the young 
controls. The interaction effect indicated that the decrement in dual task 
performance (relative to single task performance) was significantly greater 
for the participants with Alzheimer’s disease, compared to the decrement in 
dual task performance (relative to single task performance) seen in the 
elderly and young controls. That is, the decrement in dual task performance 
(relative to single task performance) in participants with Alzheimer’s disease 
was significantly steeper than the decrement in elderly and young controls 
performance, hence the crossover interaction.  
For the digit span condition, analysis of variance, again, replicated the 
non significant differences between primary tracking task performances, 
when performed without a concurrent secondary task, across the groups, F < 
1. However, when the tracking task was combined with the digit span task, 
there was a significant main effect of group (e.g., Alzheimer’s disease 
sufferers, elderly controls and young controls), F(1. 54) = 61.47, p < .001, 
and a significant interaction between group and condition (e.g., tracking 
alone and tracking plus digit span), F(1, 54) = 18.71, p < .001. This again 
suggests that each groups tracking performance was affected differently by 
the addition of the secondary digit span task. Here, the participants with 
Alzheimer’s disease performed much worse than the elderly controls, who 
themselves performed slightly better than the young controls. The interaction 
effect indicated that the decrement in dual task performance (relative to 
single task performance) was significantly greater for the participants with 
Alzheimer’s disease, compared to the decrement in dual task performance 
(relative to single task performance) seen in the elderly and young controls. 
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That is, the decrement in dual task performance (relative to single task 
performance) in participants with Alzheimer’s disease was significantly 
steeper than the decrement in elderly and young controls performance, 
hence the crossover interaction. 
 Overall, the results suggested that the combination of having 
Alzheimer’s disease and undertaking a secondary task that loads onto the 
central executive (e.g., reaction time to tones and digit span), causes a 
particularly detrimental effect on primary task tracking performance. 
Accordingly, the Alzheimer’s disease sufferers appeared to demonstrate a 
specific central executive deficit leading to difficulties coordinating two 
activities at the same time that was independent from the effects of normal 
ageing. 
 In order to test this further, Baddeley, Bressi, Della Sala, Logie, and 
Spinnler (1991) hypothesised that, if a central executive deficit does exist in 
Alzheimer’s disease, retesting Alzheimer’s participants on subsequent 
occasions would show that central executive function worsens as 
Alzheimer’s disease progresses. Accordingly, using the same tracking, 
articulatory suppression, reaction time to tones and digit span tasks, they 
retested 15 of the participants with Alzheimer’s disease, as well as 18 of the 
elderly controls that took part in the Baddeley et al. (1986) study, at both six 
and 12 month intervals. They hypothesised that there would be a difference 
between single and dual task performance and that this effect would share 
an interaction with (be dependent upon) the three testing sessions (e.g., 
scores from the original study, and scores at six and 12 months). 
Accordingly, in participants with Alzheimer’s disease, there was no main 
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effect of single task tracking performance across the testing sessions, 
showing that performance on the primary tracking task did not worsen over 
time. However, mean tracking performance in participants with Alzheimer’s 
disease, when accompanied by the simultaneous performance of a 
secondary task, progressively worsened over the three time intervals in each 
condition and these main effects were significant for the articulatory 
suppression (F(1, 14) = 39.5, p < .001) and reaction time to tones (F(1, 14) = 
81.64, p <.001) tasks. There were also significant interactions between the 
primary tracking task performance, when combined with a secondary task, 
across the suppression (F(2, 28) = 4.4, p < .025), reaction time to tones (F(2, 
28) = 18.57, p < .001) and digit span (F(2, 28) = 8.05, p < .01) conditions. 
This indicates that, in participants with Alzheimer’s, the decline in tracking 
performance was affected differently at different stages of the disease. That 
is, whilst single task performance did not progressively get worse over the 
three time intervals as Alzheimer’s disease progressed, dual task 
performance (and plausibly central executive function) did progressively get 
worse over the three time intervals. When the same analysis was conducted 
on the elderly controls there was no worsening of scores over time or 
interaction effects. These findings provide further evidence of a specific 
central executive deficit unique to Alzheimer’s disease sufferers that 
progressively becomes more impaired over time. This was later supported by 
Greene, Hodges and Baddeley (1995) who, using a dual task measure 
similar to that used by Baddeley et al. (1986) as well as a dual task measure 
taken from the Test of Everyday Attention (TEA; Robertson, Ward, Ridgeway 
& Nimmo-Smith, 1994) found that under both single and dual-task conditions, 
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impaired performance occurred in those with Alzheimer’s disease compared 
to controls, with worse performance occurring in those with more advanced 
stages of the condition.  
However, a difficulty with the interpretation of these findings is that 
any increase in task difficulty may result in impaired performance in those 
with Alzheimer’s disease as opposed to any specific central executive deficit 
under dual task conditions. To test this Baddeley et al. (1991) examined the 
effects of deterioration over time on a word categorisation task, where 30 
Alzheimer’s participants had to match words to particular categories (e.g., 
animals, jobs, colours). Here, as the task progressed, the number of 
available categories increased in frequency, thus increasing the difficulty. It 
was hypothesised that, as such semantic categories do not appear to be 
heavily dependent upon working memory capacity any increase in the 
difficulty of a task should differentially impair Alzheimer’s patients and 
become more discernible as the disease progresses. Alternately, if dual task 
coordination is a unique deficit, there will be no interaction between 
increased difficulty and test session on the word categorisation task. A two 
way analysis of variance with test session and number of categories as 
repeated measures showed that whilst increasing the number of categories 
led to decreased performance in Alzheimer’s sufferers, the magnitude of the 
effect of task difficulty did not increase as the disease progressed as there 
were no interaction effects between the number of categories and occasion 
of testing. Accordingly, Baddeley et al. (1991) used this as evidence to 
suggest that there exists a specific central executive deficit in Alzheimer’s 
disease sufferers that is not related to increasing task difficulty.  
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Central executive impairments have also been observed in more 
ecological scenarios. For example, Alberoni, Baddeley, Della Sala, Logie, & 
Spinnler (1992) found that the ability to concentrate on more than one 
conversation was impaired in Alzheimer’s disease sufferers compared to 
matched controls. Equally, Verghese et al. (2007) found that in elderly 
participants, the quality of walking gait reduced when they were asked to 
combine walking with a verbal letter sequencing task. 
Aside from central executive deficits being well documented in 
Alzheimer’s disease (see Huntley & Howard, 2009 for a review), studies 
using dual task methodology function have also revealed specific 
impairments in people with brain injury (Foley, Cantagallo, Della Sala, & 
Logie, 2010; McDowell, Whyte, & D’esposito, 1997) which has had 
implications for the rehabilitation of behavioural difficulties following brain 
injury. Here, Alderman (1996) assessed dual task performance in 10 
neurologically healthy controls, 10 brain injured participants who responded 
well to a behavioural rehabilitation programme based on operant conditioning 
principles and 10 brain injured participants who responded poorly to the 
programme. It was found that whilst the brain injured participants were 
comparable on a range of neuropsychological measures, the “poor 
responders” showed consistently significantly worse performance on the dual 
task measures compared to “responders” and controls. Alderman explained 
this as a central executive deficit in the poor responders that may lead to 
behavioural problems and poor response to operant conditioning methods 
due to a failure to attend to simultaneous monitoring of their own behaviour 
and the contingencies of any reinforcement programme. Nevertheless, 
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Alderman found that poor responders’ performance on the primary task (a 
visuo-spatial tracking task) was improved by immediate verbal feedback 
about their performance from the experimenter. Alderman therefore 
suggested that immediate verbal feedback of behaviour would support the 
ability of the poor responders’ central executive to focus on aspects of the 
environment that that they found difficult to attend to and therefore aid their 
learning ability and capacity to engage in the rehabilitation programme. 
Moreover, aside from Alzheimer’s disease and brain injury, dual task 
deficits have also been observed in people with HIV (Hinkin, Castellon, & 
Hardy, 2000), Schizophenia (Bressi, Miele, Bressi, & Astori, 1996; Junghoon, 
Glahn, Nuechterlein, & Cannon, 2004), ADHD (Kofler, Rapport, Bolden, 
Sarver, & Raiker, 2009), Parkinson’s disease (Dalrymple-Alford, Kalders, 
Jones, & Watson, 1994; Malapani, Pillon, Dubois, & Agid, 1994), depression 
(Nebes et al., 2001), people with ID (Danielson, Henry, Rönnberg, & Nilsson, 
2010) and people with Down’s Syndrome (Kittler, Krinsky-McHale, Devenny, 
& Conners, 2008; Lanfranchi, Baddeley, Gathercole, & Vianello, 2011) 
suggesting specific central executive deficits in these populations. These 
findings provide further support for the validity of the central executive as a 
construct that can be weakened in the presence of injury, illness or disability. 
However, despite its evidence and useful clinical implications, the 
majority of support for the central executive comes from studies employing 
the dual task paradigm methodology, with limited alternative experiments 
being used. Accordingly, a number of criticisms have been levelled at the 
methodology behind dual task studies. Firstly, Hegarty, Shah, and Miyake 
(2000) drew upon central bottleneck theory (Welford, 1952) which suggests 
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that dual task slowing may actually be a consequence of the inability to 
perform certain mental operations simultaneously. For example, Pashler 
(1994) found that a bottleneck phenomenon can occur in tasks that require 
rapid response selection (e.g., where two rapid responses cannot be 
delivered simultaneously, thus creating a bottleneck effect leading to 
impaired performance). Accordingly, Hegarty et al. suggested that executive 
tasks that require rapid response selection such as rapid constant number 
selection (Baddeley, 1966), could interfere with a secondary task that 
involves the same processes via a bottleneck effect, as opposed to any 
specific central executive overload. Secondly, Hegarty et al. cite research by 
Bourke, Duncan, and Nimmo-Smith (1996) which found that in dual tasks, 
participants tend to allocate more resources to those tasks which they 
perceive as more demanding, regardless of which task is designated as 
primary. Thus, there may be a strategic trade off related to the complexity of 
the tasks. Therefore, it was suggested that, when applied to the central 
executive, dual task logic might not always apply. 
Accordingly, using 120 neurologically healthy participants, Hegarty et 
al. (2000) developed three different primary visuospatial tasks that were 
thought to increase in difficulty as well as the demands they placed on the 
central executive. These included (a) a complex paper folding task that made 
the most demands on the central executive but required no rapid response 
selection, (b) a card rotating task that made a moderate demand on the 
central executive and required moderate response selection, and (c) a 
simple picture matching task that made the least demand on the central 
executive but required rapid response selection. They matched these 
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primary tasks with two secondary tasks that were thought to load heavily 
onto the central executive and required rapid response selection. The two 
executive tasks included random number generation (vocalising random 
numbers between zero and nine) and a two back task where participants had 
to listen to a series of letters and say “yes” when they heard a letter that was 
identical to the letter presented exactly two items previously and “no” if it 
were not. They hypothesised that, according to standard dual task logic, 
concurrent performance of a secondary executive task should impair the 
primary paper folding task the most, as this itself was regarded as making 
the most demands on the central executive and would therefore cause a 
central executive overload. In contrast, if a response selection bottleneck or 
a strategic trade off was occurring then performance on the primary picture 
matching task (which made least demands on the central executive) would 
be most influenced by a secondary executive task that required rapid 
response selection, as the picture matching task required rapid response 
selection itself therefore causing a bottleneck effect. In addition, the picture 
matching task was relatively simple and consequently a strategic trade off 
might occur where the participant would allocate more attentional resources 
to the executive task, which was more complex, at the expense of the picture 
matching task, thus again impairing picture matching task performance.  
Indeed, a one-way, within-subjects analysis of variance found a 
significant main effect for the difference between performance on the three 
primary visuo-spatial tasks when simultaneously performed with the 
secondary executive tasks of random number generation, F(2,46) = 12.62, p 
< .01, and the two back test, F(2,46) = 12.23, p < .01. Post hoc analysis 
39 
 
showed that for both secondary tasks, the degree of detriment on the primary 
picture matching task was significantly greater than on the card rotations and 
paper folding tests (both p <.05), which did not significantly differ from one 
and other. The authors suggested that these results supported the response 
selection bottleneck or strategic trade off hypothesis, where the addition of a 
secondary executive task that required raid response selection caused the 
greatest detriment on the picture matching task performance (hypothesised 
as loading least onto the central executive but requiring rapid response 
selection and posing a potential strategic trade off) and the least detriment 
on the paper folding task (suggested as loading most heavily onto the central 
executive thus as posing a dual task effect when accompanied by another 
executive task). From this they suggest that caution be exercised when 
interpreting the results of dual task studies and where the use of response 
selection or strategic tradeoffs can occur, researchers make efforts to control 
for these. 
Nevertheless, it could also be argued that one reason why the 
executive tasks interfered with the picture matching task was because 
response selection is an important executive function governed by the 
central executive, and as the picture matching task required response 
selection, it was tapping an executive component itself (as well as a visuo-
spatial component) therefore causing a dual task effect. The same argument 
could be applied for allocating attentional resources to a potential strategic 
trade off, which, it could be argued, might also be considered a function of 
the central executive. A further related difficulty with the study is objectively 
establishing the specific degree of central executive and/or visuo-spatial 
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sketchpad involvement needed for successful performance on each of the 
three primary visuo-spatial tasks. One potential means would be to see how 
each of the measures used in the study correlate with other measures of the 
central executive or visuo-spatial sketchpad. Whilst the paper provides some 
evidence for the executive component in the visuo-spatial tasks (by citing 
correlations between the tasks and other measures of executive function), 
there is no mention of correlations between the tasks and other tasks of 
visuo-spatial ability. Therefore, the degree to which the visuo-spatial tasks 
were tapping the visuo-spatial sketchpad, above and beyond functions that 
could be accounted for by the central executive is unclear. Thus, as there is 
evidence that each visuo-spatial task has a central executive component, 
then this could support the dual task explanation of the results if the central 
executive demands involved in the task outweigh the visuo-spatial demands. 
 Salthouse et al. (1995) outline further methodological problems with 
dual task studies. For example, across many studies, the types of tasks used 
in combination have varied. This is concerning because different types of 
tasks may tap different “pools” of attentional resources and therefore, the 
extent to which each component task places equal demand on the central 
executive is not clear. This makes it difficult to meaningfully compare results 
across studies. Equally, they cite various studies which have focused on the 
performance of the primary task, and then examined the performance 
decrement on that primary task when combined with a secondary task, 
without measuring independent performance on the secondary task. This 
gives a misleading interpretation because some participants may find 
performing the secondary task much harder/easier than others and, without 
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factoring this into the overall performance analysis, it can potentially distort 
primary task performance. One way around this has been to compute single 
task performance as a ratio of secondary task performance, however in the 
studies that have taken this approach, the mathematics used to compute the 
ratios have varied, thus further complicating comparison across studies.  
Aside from this, criticisms have also sprung up in the literature 
attacking the central executive for being vaguely specified. For example, the 
central executive has been described as a “homunculus” (Allport, 1993) or “a 
little man who sits in the head and in some mysterious way makes the 
important decisions” (Baddeley, 1996, p. 6). Indeed, Parkin (1998) outlined 
that the central executive is often used to explain away functions that cannot 
be attributed to the phonological loop or visuo-spatial sketchpad, making it “a 
concept that emerges from research by default when more rigorous 
theoretical constructs cannot handle the data” (p. 519). In response to such 
criticisms, Baddeley (1986) adopted the supervisory attentional system 
(SAS; Norman and Shallice, 1986; Shallice and Burgess, 1996) as a more 
detailed specification of the specific operation of the central executive. This 
model is described below. 
 
1.5.3 Norman and Shallice’s supervisory attentional system. 
 
The SAS offers perhaps the most detailed specification of the multiple 
processes considered under the title of executive functions. At its simplest 
level, the Norman and Shallice model comprises two main components: the 
contention scheduling system and the supervisory attentional system. The 
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contention scheduling system (CSS) governs the practice of routine 
behaviours by using incoming perceptual information to select the most 
appropriate schema (or organised plan) to suit a situation. These schemas 
are typically well rehearsed organised plans that can be deployed in routine 
situations with little conscious effort (e.g., driving the familiar route to one’s 
workplace). As these schemas generally run automatically, the CSS acts to 
select, prioritise and implement the correct schemas, based on 
environmental demands. However, in order to prevent an irrelevant schemas 
being activated in inappropriate circumstances or what Shallice (1982, p. 
201) defines as a “capture error” (e.g., accidentally driving the familiar route 
to one’s workplace on a weekend when one actually intended to go to the 
supermarket), the SAS intervenes to bias the activation of schemas so they 
are appropriate to the situation. Thus the SAS contains “the general 
programming or planning systems that can operate on schemas in every 
domain” (Shallice, 1982, p. 201), before finally monitoring and evaluating 
how effectively the schemas are operating. Plausible accounts of a 
malfunctioning SAS can be clearly observed in the aforementioned anecdotal 
accounts of patients with executive dysfunction such as Rylander’s (1939) 
description of those who are “well able to work along old lines (but) cannot 
learn to master new types of tasks” (p. 22) and Penfield and Evans’s (1935) 
report of a patient who “had become incapable of discerning for herself 
possible courses of action so that she might choose. If others presented the 
possibilities she made up her mind quite easily” (p. 131). 
One of the first tests of the SAS was undertaken by Shallice (1982) 
who adapted the traditional Tower of Hanoi test, into the Tower of London 
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test (TOLT). The TOLT includes a rectangular board supporting three 
equidistantly placed pegs of ascending heights. Three coloured discs (with 
holes through their diameter) can be placed onto the pegs. The tallest peg 
can accommodate three discs, the middle peg can accommodate two discs 
and the shortest peg can accommodate one disc. Both the examiner and 
participant have identical versions of the board. The test starts with the 
examiner placing three discs onto the participant’s board in a specified 
starting position. Behind a screen, the examiner then arranges three discs 
onto the pegs of his/her board to represent a desired goal state. The 
examiner then reveals his/her arrangement and the participant is required to 
replicate the examiners arrangement whilst obeying a set of rules. These 
include not exceeding the specified number of moves to reach the goal state, 
moving only one disc at a time, placing no more than one disc onto the 
shortest peg and two discs onto the middle peg, and ensuring that each disc 
is always placed onto one of the three pegs throughout the task and not put 
onto the table (Rainville et al., 2002). As the task progresses so do the 
number of moves required to replicate the examiners arrangement, hence 
increasing the task’s difficulty. In order to complete the task successfully, the 
participant is required to divide the task into smaller subgoals and 
progressively work through these accordingly (Shallice, 1982; Simon, 1975).  
Shallice (1982) adopted the TOLT as it had been used to test the 
planning and problem solving units of computer programmes and, as the 
SAS is regarded as performing these functions itself, it is plausible that such 
a measure would also test the planning and problem solving abilities of 
humans. Equally, successful performance on the TOLT does not require the 
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use of any special purpose subroutines, thus relying exclusively on the SAS 
and nullifying the need for the CSS. Accordingly, those with an intact SAS 
would perform much better on the TOLT compared to those without, where it 
would be expected that distractibility and perseveration would occur 
(Shallice, 1982). To test this, Shalilce assessed 61 participants with brain 
injuries and 20 healthy controls on the TOLT. Using computer tomography 
(CT) scans, the brain injured participants were divided into lesion site 
(posterior or frontal) and hemisphere (left or right). Results showed that the 
participants with left frontal lesions completed significantly fewer problems on 
the TOLT than those with right frontal lesions, posterior lesions and controls 
(unfortunately actual significance values are not reported in this paper). 
 A difficulty with this study however, is that the TOLT is a specific test 
of the SAS rather than both the SAS and the CSS. However, this was 
overcome by the subsequent development of the Hayling Sentence 
Completion Test (Burgess & Shallice, 1996a). This requires the examinee to 
initially complete a sentence read out by the examiner with a word that 
plausibly makes sense (part A). For example, the examiner would read out 
“the captain went down with the sinking” to which the examinee would most 
logically respond “ship” (Chan et al., 2008). In part B the examinee is 
required to complete the examiners sentence with a word that is completely 
unconnected. For example, responding with the word “cow” to the sentence 
“the captain went down with the sinking” (Chan et al., 2008). On both parts 
the examinee is timed and needs to respond as quickly as possible. Shallice 
and Burgess (1996) suggest that performance on part A simply requires use 
of the CSS to initiate a logical response. However, to succeed in part B the 
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participant must use the SAS to develop a novel strategy (or temporary 
schema) in order to produce a word prior to the examiner finishing the 
sentence (in order to respond as quickly as possible) and monitor its 
effectiveness. To test this Burgess and Shallice measured 47 participants 
with frontal lesions, 27 participants with posterior lesions and 20 controls. 
Here, on part A (straightforward sentence completion), a one way analysis of 
variance showed significant differences in the speed of responding across 
groups (p < .002). Post hoc analysis showed that the participants in the 
frontal group were significantly slower than controls (p < .01) whereas none 
of the remaining comparisons was significant at the p < .05 level. For section 
B (irregular sentence completion), a one way analysis of variance also 
showed a significant difference in errors between groups (p < .002). Here, 
post hoc analysis showed that the participants in the frontal group committed 
more errors than the controls (p < .05) and the participants with posterior 
lesions (p < .01). Nevertheless, on part B there were no differences in 
response latencies across the groups. Indeed, critically, there was no 
correlation between performance on part A compared to performance on part 
B in participants with frontal lobe lesions (r = .19, ns) whereas there was a 
significant correlation between the two parts in controls (r = .59, p < .01) and 
participants with posterior lesions (r = .39, p < .05) suggesting that the two 
tasks maybe tapping two separable processes: part A, response initiation as 
governed by the CSS and part B, suppression of a habitual response as 
governed by the SAS. Specifically the lack of correlation in the participants 
with frontal lesions suggests that the SAS may have been differentially 
impaired in many of these participants, hence no correlation between the two 
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measures. In contrast, the correlation between parts A and B in the 
participants with posterior lesions and controls suggests that many of these 
participants had a functional SAS and CSS. This was confirmed by findings 
that four participants with frontal lobe lesions and one with a posterior lesion 
scored within one standard deviation of the mean on part A, but less than 
three standard deviations of the mean on part B, whereas one participant 
with a frontal lesion showed the opposite pattern (poor performance on part 
A but good performance on part B). This again suggested that two different 
types of strategy responses were being tapped by performance on parts A 
and B (e.g., the CSS and the SAS respectively).  
However, despite this evidence the SAS was still itself vaguely 
specified and subject to the same criticisms that were levelled at Baddeley’s 
central executive (Shallice, 2002). Thus, in order to refine the workings of the 
SAS, Shallice and Burgess (1996) updated the model. This outlined the SAS 
as responsible for a number of processes carried out by different 
subsystems, which work together in a globally integrated function (Shallice & 
Burgess, 1996). Shallice and Burgess outline these processes as including 
working memory, monitoring, rejection of schema, spontaneous schema 
generation, adoption of processing mode (problem solving), goal setting, 
delayed intention marker realisation (remembering to do something in the 
future) and episodic memory retrieval (drawing upon memory from past 
experiences). 
 The application of these processes is highlighted in the Brixton Spatial 
Anticipation Test (Burgess & Shallice, 1996b). This involves presenting the 
examinee with a continuous array of 56 pages of 10 circles arranged in a 2 x 
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5 matrix. One of the circles is always shaded and moves around the array in 
a predictable pattern (or rule) across each consecutive page. For example, 
the shaded circle may start by moving in a chronological order (e.g., 1, 2, 3, 
4, 5), but intermittently the rule will change (e.g., 1, 5, 1, 5, 1, 5). The 
examinee therefore has to detect that a change in rule has occurred and 
modify their responses accordingly. Burgess and Shallice (1996b) measured 
40 participants with frontal lesions, 24 participants with lesions outside of the 
frontal lobes and 20 controls on the Brixton Spatial Anticipation Test. Three 
different types of error score were plausible. These included (a) all errors that 
could be attributed to perseveration with a rule when it was inappropriate to 
continue with its use, (b) all other errors that could be attributed to the use of 
some incorrect rule (e.g., misapplication of a previously active rule) and (c) 
the number of times a rule is changed when there is no need to do so. 
Results showed that the frontal groups produced more errors across all types 
than posteriors, however this was only significant for type b (p < .05) and c 
errors (p < .005). Nevertheless, error types a and b correlated significantly 
with one another (r = .60, p < .01), however error type c correlated with 
neither a (r = .13) nor b (r = .13) errors. Shallice and Burgess (1996) 
interpreted this as suggesting that there were two separable factors on the 
Brixton test, which was supported by structural equation modelling. Here, the 
first factor (responsible for the correlation between error types a and b) was 
associated with an inability to produce a new hypothesis, or the strategy 
generation process, which they proposed as involving the aforementioned 
working memory, monitoring, rejection of schema, and spontaneous schema 
generation functions of the SAS. In contrast, the second factor, responsible 
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for error type c related to a malfunction in the adoption of processing mode 
(problem solving) function of the SAS by being in temporary search of an 
appropriate new schema, instead of being able to implement and activate a 
new schema. 
 Impaired performance on these measures (the TOLT, Hayling test and 
Brixton test) has been demonstrated in cognitively impaired groups such as 
those with schizophrenia (Marczewski, Van der Linden, & Larøi, 2001), 
Parkinson’s disease (Bouquet, Bonnaud, & Gil, 2003), Alzheimer’s disease 
(Lange, Sahakian, Quinn, Marsden, & Robbins, 1995) and older (relative to 
younger) people (Andrés & Van der Linden, 2000), thus further attesting to 
the validity of the theory.  
Indeed, the SAS provides a much more comprehensive model of the 
multiple processes that might be undertaken by a central 
executive/supervisory system, thus overcoming criticisms of such a concept 
being a homunculus. Moreover, the SAS accounts for findings where 
correlations between tests purported to measure frontal lobe function are 
low, as the different tests may be measuring different aspects of executive 
function, which may be impaired in isolation (Shallice & Burgess, 1996). 
Indeed, Burgess et al. (1998) have shown that there are a range of different 
factors underlying the behavioural symptoms of the dysexecutive syndrome, 
as sampled by the DEX, rather than just one (e.g., goal neglect). Moreover, 
Burgess et al. showed that these different symptoms were consistent with 
different patterns of performance on executive tests. For example, different 
measures of executive function loaded significantly onto the DEX factor 
scales of inhibition, intentionality and executive memory respectively. This 
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suggests that influences beyond goal neglect or g may be influencing 
performance on these measures and that in this case, different areas of the 
SAS might explain these impairments respectively. Thus, a multiple process 
approach such as that of the SAS accommodates these data well, not least 
in that it accounts for findings where individuals with frontal lobe lesions, who 
appear to perform well on many neuropsychological assessments, show very 
specific dysexecutive symptoms in the absence of others, such as deficits in 
decision making (Eslinger & Damasio, 1985) multitasking (Goldstein, 
Bernard, Fenwick, Burgess & McNeil, 1993; Shallice & Burgess, 1991) or 
confabulation (Burgess & McNeil, 1999). Here, it can be suggested that 
specific functions of the SAS are impaired in isolation. 
On top of this, there has been a strong push amongst researchers to 
develop measures of the SAS that are more predictive of the types of 
dysexecutive problems encountered in everyday life. Two of these include 
the Multiple Errands Test (MET) and the Six Element Test (SET; Shallice & 
Burgess, 1991). The MET was originally designed to be carried out in a 
shopping centre and test the planning, multitasking and prospective memory 
capabilities of the SAS but in a “real life” environment. The SET represents a 
diluted, office based analogue for the MET but was developed to measure a 
subset of the same cognitive processes as the MET and thus remain 
sensitive to everyday dysexecutive problems (Burgess, 2000; Wilson et al. 
1998). These measures and their theoretical links to the SAS are described 
in more detail in the proceeding sections.  
More recent support for the SAS has been gathered through the 
model being the basis upon which test batteries such as the Behavioural 
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Assessment of the Dysexecutive Syndrome (BADS; Wilson, Alderman, 
Burgess, Emslie, & Evans, 1996; Wilson et al., 1998) have been developed. 
The BADS is a battery of six subtests which are designed to be more 
reflective of the types of executive skills required in everyday life including 
planning, self directed organisation, temporal judgement, set shifting, 
inhibition of established responses and novel problem solving (Manchester, 
Priestley, & Jackson, 2004). The BADS is widely used in clinical practice and 
has a large body of normative data. However, perhaps most promising is the 
data supporting the test battery’s ecological validity. Here, Wilson et al. 
(1998) found that BADS total profile score correlates well with relatives or 
carers impressions of how participants with brain injuries function as rated by 
the DEX questionnaire, r = -.62, p < .001, where higher BADS score means 
better executive function, whereas higher DEX score means worse executive 
function. Equally, Bennett, Ong and Ponsford (2005) found that DEX ratings 
made by a neuropsychologist and occupational therapist significantly 
correlated with the BADS total profile scores of brain injured participants, r = 
-.37, p < .01 and r = -.39, p < .01, respectively. Also, Norris & Tate (2000) 
found that for three subtests of the BADS that were able to significantly 
discriminate between brain injured participants and neurologically healthy 
controls (Action Program test, Zoo Map test and the SET), these measures 
were also able to significantly predict Role Functioning Scale score 
(McPheeters, 1984; a measure of work, independent living and self care, 
immediate social network and extended social network), F(3,31) = 3.19, p < 
.04, with the adjusted R² indicating that these measures accounted for 16.2% 
of the variance. In contrast, out of a range of other measures of executive 
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function not included in the BADS battery, only two; the Controlled Oral Word 
Association Test (Borkowski, Benton, & Spreen, 1967) and Porteus Mazes 
Test (Porteus, 1965) were able to discriminate between brain injured and 
neurologically healthy controls. However, neither of these was able to predict 
Role Functioning Scale score. 
 In sum, the multiple processes approach of the SAS is regarded here 
as being of most use to the study of executive functions. It is able to support 
the presence of a range of executive processes within one framework and 
several measures have been developed to test it which have ecological 
considerations built in. Accordingly, the measures selected for this study are 
those designed to test the SAS. Unfortunately, however not all measures of 
executive function have been developed with such ecological considerations 
in mind. Thus, prior to the measures used in this study being described more 
fully, a critical evaluation of measures that lack ecological considerations is 
offered.  
 
1.6 Critical Evaluation of “Traditional” Measures of Executive 
Function 
 
Whilst the benefits of experimentally testing theoretical models of 
executive function, are acknowledged, the leap from theory to practice is 
often complicated. Burgess and Robertson (2002) outline that there is often 
far less correspondence between the experimental paradigms used in 
research and the situations normally encountered by people in everyday life. 
Moreover, traditional tests of executive function that have been used to test 
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such experimental paradigms often bear little resemblance to everyday 
tasks. The example of the MWCST, as described by Burgess et al. (2006), 
offers a useful illustration of this. Burgess et al. describe the MWCST as the 
most used and thoroughly investigated measure in the field of human frontal 
lobe function. The MWCST is typically considered a measure of “set shifting” 
where the examinee has to change the way they arrange a series of cards 
according to feedback from the examiner concerning whether or not they are 
pursuing the correct strategy. Burgess et al. suggest that, in theoretical 
terms, this test could plausibly be understood as a measure of working 
memory, supporting the ability to shift set. However, they suggest that as the 
MWCST is so unlike situations posed by everyday life, very few, if any, 
generalisations can be drawn about how MWCST performance may relate to 
everyday human activities or behaviours. Burgess and Robertson (2002) 
offer a similar argument for the aforementioned TOLT. As stated, the TOLT 
is traditionally considered a test of “planning” where the examinee is required 
to arrange a series of discs, onto a set of pegs, in a specified order, whilst 
obeying a series of rules. However, Burgess and Robertson suggest that 
planning in “real life”, which may take the form of arranging a weekend away, 
a holiday or a meal for friends is completely unlike the demands posed by 
the TOLT. Similar arguments can be levelled against most mainstream 
measures of executive function and neuropsychological assessments in 
general. This questions the ecological validity of most neuropsychological 
assessments. Accordingly, measures low in ecological validity challenge how 
accurate a clinician can be when developing a formulation of how a patient’s 
neuropsychological test scores may translate to their everyday behaviour. 
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This leads one to consider the utility of alternative assessments that can 
capture symptoms of the dysexecutive syndrome in contexts more relevant 
to everyday life. Indeed, Alderman and Baker (2009) describe such 
measures as having two advantages. Firstly, as they are designed to tap the 
cognitive demands that are required in everyday life, meaningful inferences 
can be drawn to assist in clinical assessment and formulation, to guide 
interventions relevant to “real life” impairments. Secondly, such assessments 
may also be useful tools in the actual remediation of executive difficulties 
themselves. However, prior to considering the availability of such measures it 
is first useful to discuss how the above discussion relates to people with ID. 
 
1.7 Executive Function and Intellectual Disability: A Relevant 
Construct? 
 
The vast majority of research investigating executive function has 
focused on people with brain injuries. Nevertheless, there also exist wide 
bodies of research examining cognitive impairment in people with dementia 
and schizophrenia, all of which have been the subject of considerable efforts 
to remediate such difficulties (Clare & Woods, 2001; Oddy & Worthington, 
2009; Wykes & Reeder, 2005). Despite this, research examining executive 
function in the field of ID has been minimal. This is surprising because 
theoretical models of executive function may have much to offer in 
understanding the difficulties faced by people with ID in everyday life. 
Indeed, a diagnosis of an intellectual disability according to the DSM-IV-TR 
54 
 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000) is considered to be (a) an IQ of 
approximately 70 or below and (b): 
“concurrent deficits or impairments in present adaptive functioning (i.e. 
the person’s effectiveness in meeting the standards expected for his 
age or her age by his or her cultural group) in at least two of the 
following areas: communication, self-care, home living, social – 
interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self direction, 
functional academic skills, work, leisure and health and safety” (Carr & 
O’Reilly, 2007, pp. 7).  
Looking at the above list, bearing in mind Oscar-Berman and 
Marinković’s (2007) definition of executive function at the beginning of this 
chapter, it is plausible that deficits in executive function could serve as a 
useful framework through which impairments in, at least, home living, social 
– interpersonal skills and self direction could be formulated in people with ID, 
by making reference to models of executive functioning. Whilst the 
relationship between frontal lobe impairment and executive dysfunction may 
not be as straightforward in people with ID compared to people with overt 
frontal lobe damage, the argument advocated here, as outlined above, is that 
behavioural/functional observations are much more useful than anatomical 
ones for developing a clinical formulation of and intervention for dysexecutive 
symptoms. 
Unfortunately, testing a possible executive function hypothesis in 
people with ID is difficult as the majority of standard measures of executive 
function tend to be too complex or rely too heavily on verbal skills for people 
with ID, resulting in floor effects (Masson, Dagnan, & Evans, 2010). 
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Nevertheless, recent research has attempted to adapt and evaluate 
measures of executive function for ID samples (e.g., Adams & Oliver, 2010; 
Ball, Holland, Treppner, Watson, & Huppert, 2008; Dymond, Bailey, Willner, 
& Parry, 2010; Lanfranchi et al., 2011; Masson et al., 2010; Willner, Bailey, 
Parry, & Dymond, 2010a). Of these, one measure which has appeared in all 
of the aforementioned studies is the TOLT. As outlined above, the TOLT was 
originally developed as a measure of the SAS. However, a major criticism of 
the TOLT is that, whilst it is largely regarded as a test of planning, it lacks 
ecological validity. This is true of nearly all of the other known measures of 
executive function that have been adapted for people with ID to date. Again, 
this limits the ability the clinician has to translate test scores onto the 
everyday behaviour of people with ID, thus limiting the implications that such 
assessments have for clinical formulation and intervention. Thus, there exists 
an opportunity to develop parallel measures of executive function for people 
with ID that are designed to have ecological validity. The potential for 
developing such measures is now discussed. 
 
1.8 Developing Ecologically Valid Executive Function Assessments 
for People with Intellectual Disability 
 
Willner et al. (2010a) suggest that one approach to test development 
in people with ID is to adapt versions of tests that have been developed for 
and validated on more able people. A brief search of the literature suggests 
that several measures which appear to have ecological validity do exist. 
Perhaps the most well known is the BADS described above. Nevertheless, 
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whilst promising, the BADS remains an office based test and Willner et al. 
(2010a) found floor effects on three out of the six subtests from the 
children’s version of the BADS (BADS-C; Emslie, Wilson, Burden, Nimmo-
Smith, & Wilson, 2003) in people with ID, suggesting that this measure was 
at the lower limit of usability with ID groups. Accordingly, this test battery, 
whilst offering a more ecological approach to executive function 
assessment, may not be the most appropriate for people with ID.  
Alternately, there exist several further ecologically based measures 
that could be considered as having the potential to be adapted for ID 
populations. For example, Baum et al. (2008) developed the Executive 
Function Performance Test. This comprises four individual tests including 
preparing a light meal, managing medications, using the telephone and 
paying bills. Baum et al. describe these tests as tapping the executive skills 
of initiation, execution, organisation, sequencing, judgement and safety and 
completion. Also, Chevignard et al. (2000, 2008) developed three tasks 
including shopping for groceries, cooking, answering a letter and finding a 
way to post the reply, all designed as measures of an individual’s 
multitasking capabilities. Equally, Lamberts, Evans, and Spikman (2009) 
developed the Executive Secretarial Task, designed to test the organisation 
and prioritisation of multiple secretarial/administrative type tasks over a long 
time span, whilst dealing with delayed intentions, interruptions and deadlines. 
Overall, these measures clearly cover a range of everyday scenarios that are 
likely to challenge ones executive capabilities. However, the frequency with 
which they appear in the literature is limited to the few studies in which they 
are described meaning that the data on their psychometric properties, whilst 
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promising, is limited. Nevertheless, one similar measure for which a much 
wider body of literature exists is the MET. 
 
1.8.1 The Multiple Errands Test. 
 
The MET was originally developed by Shallice and Burgess (1991) in 
order to capture the everyday task impairments of people with acquired brain 
injuries who were able to perform adequately on most mainstream 
neuropsychological tests, despite family members reporting significant 
impairments in their general activities of daily living. Accordingly, Shallice 
and Burgess developed a measure that could be undertaken within a real 
shopping centre in order to assess the examinee’s ability to function outside 
of structured office based settings. Here, the participants were given a list of 
tasks to undertake whilst following a series of rules. Whilst the tasks were 
relatively simple, the rules were designed to increase the test’s planning, 
multitasking and prospective memory demands (Alderman et al., 2003; 
Burgess & Alderman, 2004). Shallice and Burgess described successful 
performance on the MET as dependent on the ability of the SAS to (a) 
identify a goal, (b) create a plan, (c) create a “marker” to help the plan be 
realised effectively at a later time, (d) trigger the “marker” when necessary, 
and (e) monitor and evaluate the process to assist the creation of subgoals 
and/or modify of the plan if necessary. An example of the exercise sheet 
used in a version of the MET developed by Knight, Alderman, and Burgess 
(2002) is in Appendix A. Essentially, the participant is required to undertake 
six “doing tasks” (e.g., buy a can of Coca-Cola), four “information tasks” 
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(e.g., find out the price of a Mars bar) and one “meeting” or prospective 
memory task (e.g., meet the examiner at a specified landmark after a certain 
period of time). Finally, the participant must tell the examiner when they have 
finished. The rules include tenets such as, “you should not go back into a 
building you have already been in”. The MET has four main outcome 




Examples of MET error categories on the MET 
Note. Adapted from “Beyond the shopping centre: using the Multiple Errands 
Test in the assessment and rehabilitation of multi-tasking disorders,” By N. 
Alderman and D. Baker, In M. Oddy, and A. Worthington, 2009, 
Rehabilitation of executive disorders: A guide to theory and practice, p. 103. 
Copyright 2009 by Oxford University Press. 
 
Shallice and Burgess (1991) originally found that three participants 
with frontal lobe damage who (as stated, despite performing in the average 
and above average ranges on most traditional neuropsychological tests, 
including those of executive function), performed much more poorly on the 
MET compared to controls. This work was supported by Goldstein et al. 
(1993) in a subsequent case study of a patient who underwent a left frontal 
Error category Definition Example 
Inefficiencies Where a more efficient 
strategy could have 
been applied. 
Buying multiple items or larger 
items than needed (e.g., buying 
more than four first class stamps 
or a bottle of coke rather than a 
can). 
 
Rule breaks Where a specific rule 
was broken. 
 
Spent more money than allowed. 
Interpretation 
failures 
Where a task was 
misunderstood. 
 
Writing down the opening and 
closing times of the library when 
only opening time was necessary. 
 




If the participant didn’t meet the 
examiner within one minute of the 
meeting time or didn’t state the 
time when meeting. 
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lobectomy following a frontal lobe tumour who was found to generally 
perform in the average and above average range on most 
neuropsychological tests, but performed poorly on the MET. 
 These studies showed early promise in identifying the everyday 
impairments that can be overlooked by many neuropsychological tests. 
However, they were largely of small n or single case design and therefore 
relied primarily on descriptive statistics. The participants were also in the 
average to superior IQ ranges and it was therefore unclear how well people 
with lower IQs would cope with such a measure. 
 In response to this, Alderman et al. (2003) used a between groups 
design to investigate the utility of a simplified version of the MET adapted for 
shopping centres (MET-SV) that would avoid floor effects in people with 
lower IQs. Here, they assessed 50 people with brain injury and 46 
neurologically healthy controls. Results showed that total MET-SV errors 
were significantly different between groups (t = 4.03, p < .001). MET-SV task 
failures correlated with BADS profile score (r = -.46, p < .01) and MWCST 
perseverative errors (r = .39, p = < .01), where high MET-SV scores and 
MWCST perseverative errors mean more executive dysfunction but a high 
BADS score means better executive function. Of 29 brain injured participants 
who also undertook three traditional executive tests used in this study, 
including the Cognitive Estimates Test (Shallice & Evans, 1978), a Verbal 
Fluency Test (Benton, 1968) and the MWCST, 17 passed them. However, 
only five of this 29 performed within acceptable limits on the MET-SV. This 
suggests that there are executive processes in the real world that may not be 
tapped by these traditional measures. In further analysing the MET-SV error 
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types, Aldernman et al. found two factors emerged that characterised the 
brain injured participants’ MET-ID performance, accounting for 62% of the 
variance. These included (a) rule breaking behaviour and (b) failure to 
achieve set tasks. These two categories showed significant differences in 
how independent raters scored them on the DEX questionnaire. Here, rule 
breakers were found to have more problems with executive memory 
symptoms (e.g., problems with confabulation and temporal sequencing), 
whereas task failures were found to show more negative affect (e.g., shallow 
affect and apathy). 
 Whilst the benefits of assessing people in shopping centres are clearly 
useful, this is often not pragmatically possible within the constraints of clinical 
settings. Knight et al. (2002) therefore used a between groups design to 
investigate the utility of an adapted version of the MET for use in a hospital 
grounds (MET-HV) to ease the difficulties that might come about from 
assessing participants in more public settings. Here, they assessed 20 
participants with brain injury and 20 neurologically healthy controls. They 
found a significant difference between MET-HV total errors across groups (t 
= 5.25, p < .001). MET-HV total errors also correlated highly with BADS total 
profile score (r = -.57, p = .009) and MWCST perseverative errors (r = .67, p 
= .001), where high MET-HV scores and MWCST perseverative errors mean 
more executive dysfunction but a high BADS score means better executive 
function. After partialling out age, memory and familiarity with hospital 
grounds, MET-HV task failures correlated with four of the five DEX outcome 
measures (between r = .51 and .79, all p < .038), where both high MET-HV 
and DEX scores mean worse executive function. This work was supported 
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by Dawson et al. (2009) who extended the MET-HV to assess 14 post stroke 
participants, 14 participants with a brain injury and 25 neurologically healthy 
controls on the measure. The effect size between MET-HV performance of 
the stroke participants and their controls was large (d = .98) whereas the 
effect size between the brain injury group and their controls was moderate (d 
= .54). Inter-rater reliability across outcome measures ranged from r = .71 to 
.88 (all p < .001). In further work that was designed to overcome difficulties 
associated with assessing patients who might not be able to leave the 
confines of a hospital ward (for legal or pragmatic reasons), Pennington 
(2006) used a between groups design investigating the utility of a version of 
the MET adapted for a hospital ward (MET-WV) in 21 participants with brain 
injury and 24 neurologically healthy controls. It was found that total MET-WV 
errors were significantly different between groups (t = 5.23, p < .001) and 
significantly related to BADS profile score (r = -.55, p < .05), where high 
MET-WV scores mean worse executive function but high BADS score means 
better executive function. 
Other work has taken this a step further and adapted the MET for use 
in virtual environments. Here, McGeorge et al. (2001) developed a virtual 
reality version of the MET for a university department. They assessed five 
participants with brain injury and five neurologically healthy controls, finding a 
significant difference between the number of errands completed by the two 
groups (F = 8.86, p < .05). The correlation between performance on the 
virtual MET and its real life university department analogue across all 
participants was high (r = .79, p < .01). Subsequently, Rand, Basha-Abu, 
Rukan, Weiss, & Katz (2009) developed a virtual reality version of the MET-
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SV and compared nine post stroke participants, 20 neurologically healthy 
“young” participants and 20 neurologically healthy “older” participants. There 
was a strong correlation between total errors on an adapted version of the 
MET-SV and the virtual MET-SV (r = .77, p < .01). A significant correlation 
also emerged between virtual MET-SV total errors and performance on the 
Zoo Map subtest from the BADS (r = -.93, p < .001) and the Instrumental 
Activities of Daily Living Questionnaire (r = -.76, p < .04) in the post stroke 
group, where high scores on the virtual MET-SV mean worse executive 
function but high scores on the Zoo Map subtest and Instrumental Activities 
of Daily Living Questionnaire mean better functioning. Virtual MET-SV errors 
were also higher in the post stroke group, followed by the neurologically 
healthy “older” participants, whose errors were greater than the 
neurologically healthy “younger” participants ( ² = 30.07, p < .001). A 
difficulty with these studies however is the small samples used. In addition, it 
is unclear the extent to which virtual environments can be considered 
representative of real world environments as they are arguably far removed 
from a direct analogue of everyday living. Nevertheless, such virtual 
environments are pragmatic and perhaps of most importance have given rise 
to work examining rehabilitative interventions. Accordingly, Rand, Weiss, & 
Katz, (2009) report a case series to investigate the utility of the virtual MET-
SV as a tool remediating multitasking impairments post stroke.  Here, they 
gave four post stroke participants ten, 60 minute training sessions on the 
virtual MET-SV over a 3 week period. Descriptive statistics showed that all 
participants demonstrated an improvement from pre to post intervention 
performance on the real life version of the MET-SV after training on the 
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virtual MET-SV. However, none was able to attain a fully independent level 
of shopping post intervention. 
A difficulty with the aforementioned studies however is that despite 
many of the participants being taken from a heterogeneous group of “brain 
injured” or post stroke participants, neuroanatomical issues have been 
largely neglected in MET research. Whilst the limitations of this approach 
have been considered above (see section 1.3), based on research that 
damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPC) is a region of the 
frontal lobes believed to be heavily implicated in real world decision making 
(Bechara & Damiaso, 2005; Eslinger & Damasio, 1985), Tranel, Hathaway-
Nepple, and Anderson (2007) investigated whether damage to this area of 
the brain would predict impaired performance on the MET-SV relative to 
brain damage outside of this region. Accordingly, they assessed nine 
participants with bilateral damage to the VMPC, 8 with frontal damage 
outside the VMPC, 17 with non frontal brain damage and 20 neurologically 
healthy controls. A one way analysis of variance revealed a main effect of 
group for MET-SV total errors (F [3, 50] = 6.78, p = .001), where the VMPC 
group had the largest number of errors, those with frontal damage outside 
the VMPC region attaining the second largest number of errors, those with 
non frontal brain damage scoring the third and the healthy controls making 
the fewest errors. 
Further work attesting to the involvement of the neuroanatomical 
regions involved in the MET is offered by Burgess, Alderman, Volle, Benoit, 
and Gilbert (2009) who presented data from the neuropsychological 
assessments of two participants who took part in the Alderman et al. (2003). 
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The authors suggest that the data support a double dissociation where, 
contrary to previous findings of above average neuropsychological test 
scores and impaired MET performance, the two participants showed normal 
MET-SV performance in the presence of impaired performance on other 
neuropsychological tests. From this, Burgess et al. suggest that there are 
brain areas that support MET performance which are independent of those 
used in tests of IQ, memory, or other executive function abilities. 
 Whilst the data is limited to brain injured and post stroke populations, 
and the MET remains under relative development, its strengths lie in its 
inherent ecological validity as a tool for assessing functional difficulties, 
which may be used to inform targeted remediating interventions. It is 
undertaken in an environment outside of the typical office setting and can 
provide a quantitative and seemingly ecologically valid measure of executive 
function in the real world, as well as give the examiner a subjective 
understanding of the participant’s ability to deploy executive skills in 
everyday life. This may therefore be a useful measure to adapt for the 
ecological assessment of executive function in people with ID. 
 
1.9 Review of the Argument, Aims of the Study and Research 
Hypotheses 
 
This introduction section has outlined the argument for the need to 
develop ecologically valid assessments for people with ID. Initially, it was 
suggested that a focus on the behavioural symptoms of executive 
dysfunction (e.g., the dysexecutive syndrome) may serve as more effective 
66 
 
means of informing clinical formulation and intervention, above and beyond 
the practice of anatomical localisation. It was then suggested that theoretical 
models of executive function (particularly the SAS) may help the clinician 
understand some of the everyday difficulties faced by people with ID, and 
provide implications for remediating such difficulties. However, the traditional 
measures with which executive function has been assessed were criticised 
for lacking ecological validity, including the executive function measures that 
have been adapted for people with ID. The MET was therefore then 
suggested as a potential measure that could be adapted for people with ID in 
order to provide an assessment of how executive function deficits may play 
out in the everyday life of someone with ID. 
 The aims of the study were therefore to assess whether a modified 
version of the MET for people with ID (MET-ID) could be developed. The 
ecological validity of the MET-ID was then assessed by correlating MET-ID 
performance with three measures of executive function (or dysexecutive 
symptoms). Traditionally, formal means of assessing the ecological validity of 
neuropsychological tests has taken the form of exploring how well self and 
informant based questionnaires, clinician rating scales and observation of 
everyday simulated tasks correlate with neuropsychological test performance 
(Chaytor, Schmitter-Edgecombe, & Burr, 2006). Accordingly, the 
Independent rater version of the DEX (DEX-IR; Burgess et al., 1996) was 
used, alongside a version of the TOLT adapted for people with ID (Masson et 
al., 2010) and the Six Parts Test (SPT; Emslie et al., 2003). The SPT is a 
subtest from the BADS-C, and a simplified version of the SET. As stated 
above, Shallice and Burgess (1991) first developed the SET along with the 
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MET, as an office based means of capturing the everyday task impairments 
that appeared to be overlooked by traditional neuropsychological 
assessments (Burgess, 2000). The SPT thus offers a plausibly ecologically 
valid, but office based measure to compare with MET-ID performance, 
alongside the purportedly less ecologically valid TOLT. The research 
hypotheses are therefore: 
 
1) The DEX-IR will correlate more strongly with the MET-ID scales and 
the SPT compared to the TOLT as the MED-ID and SPT are designed 
to be more predictive of the “real life” symptoms of SAS impairment. 
 
2) There will be a stronger correlation between the MET-ID scales and 
the SPT compared to the correlation between the MET-ID and the 
TOLT as the MET-ID and SPT are designed to tap a subset of the 

















This chapter outlines the methodology used in the study. Firstly, the 
design is outlined before details about the participants in terms of 
inclusion/exclusion criteria, recruitment, power analysis and ethical 
considerations are presented. The measures used in the study are then 
described along with details of their administration scoring, validity and 





The study employed a cross sectional, correlational design using a 
single sample of participants with ID. This was appropriate so that measures 
of the SAS could be compared to assess their degree of correlation. 
Accordingly, there was only one group of participants measured on one 
occasion. 
Previous investigations using the MET have employed between group 
designs where the MET performance of groups with potential executive 
impairment (e.g., those with acquired brain injuries) has been compared with 
the MET performance of neurologically healthy controls. This was considered 
inappropriate for the present study as it was anticipated that the MET-ID 
would require substantial adaptation to make it accessible to an ID sample. 
Such adaptation may therefore compromise the MET-ID’s validity in non ID 
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populations making group comparisons difficult. Therefore, the aims of this 
study were simply to establish a basis for the utility the MET-ID in an ID 




2.3.1  Inclusion/exclusion criteria and demographic data. 
 
Inclusion criteria were adults, aged 18-65, attending day centres for 
people with ID. Participants were required to have an IQ within the 50-70 
range as measured by the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence 
(WASI; Wechsler, 1999) to indicate the presence of an ID of “mild” severity 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Exclusion criteria were those who 
had an acquired brain injury, dementia or schizophrenia as these can impair 
the SAS independent of ID (Marczewski et al., 2001; Perry & Hodges, 1999; 
Wilson et al., 1996). 
Overall, 48 participants took part. This included eight participants used 
to pilot a provisional version of the MET-ID and 40 participants used to trial 
the final adapted version (details of the piloting procedure are given below). 
The eventual sample comprised 62.5% females, with a mean (with standard 
deviations in parentheses) age of 45 (9.27) years, range 28-64. The 





2.3.2  Recruitment. 
 
Participants were recruited from day centres for people with ID in the 
Norfolk region. As it was recognised that people with ID may be vulnerable to 
acquiescence (which may make them liable to consent to participate without 
understanding the full implications) the manager of the day centre was asked 
to identify potential participants for the study, as opposed to the chief 
investigator (CI) approaching them directly. Specifically, the day centre 
manager was asked to identify participants who were felt able to understand 
(a) the purpose and nature of the research, (b) what the research involves, 
(c) its benefits (or lack of benefits), (d) the risks, burdens and alternatives to 
taking part, (e) be able to retain the information long enough to make an 
effective decision, (f) be able to make a free choice and (g) be capable of 
making the particular decision at the time it needs to be made. On top of this 
the manager was asked to exclude anyone who might have dementia, 
schizophrenia and/or acquired brain injury.  
Once identified, a member of staff well known to the potential 
participant was asked to assess the participant’s interest in taking part by 
introducing them to an information sheet (Appendix B). This was again to 
reduce potential pressure on the participant to consent. Only if verbal 
consent was initially given did the CI then approach the participant, 
reintroduce the information sheet, seek written informed consent (Appendix 
C) and collect demographic data (Appendix D). 
The study also required an “informant” (e.g., member of day centre 
staff) to complete the DEX-IR for each participant. Here, staff members were 
treated as participants in their own right and were given information about 
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the study by the day centre manager who subsequently asked if they would 
volunteer to give ratings. Those who responded favourably were given a 
separate information sheet (Appendix E) and subsequently met with the CI to 
provide informed consent (Appendix F). 
 
2.3.3  Sample size. 
 
At time of writing, there was no known accepted method for 
calculating power in situations where correlated correlations will be 
compared. In view of this, a sample size was estimated using a method 
outlined by Bush (2011), based on what was judged to be an acceptable 
lower bound 95% confidence interval surrounding a desired correlation 
between the MET-ID and the DEX-IR. This method was adopted because it 
allows an estimate of the number of participants required to achieve a 
specified correlation between two variables, based on a parameter for how 
far any correlation falling below the lower bound confidence interval would 
need to be in order for it to be considered unlikely to occur in the general 
population. In previous work examining correlations between the MET and 
observer ratings of executive dysfunction in everyday life, Knight et al. (2002) 
found that MET task failures correlated with four out of the five factor scales 
on the DEX-IR; between r = .51 and r = .79 (all p < .05). Therefore, a desired 
r of .80 was adopted for this study. In order to calculate the 95% lower bound 
confidence interval around this, a sample size of 40 was chosen, based on 
previous related work where this sample size has been used (e.g., Dymond 
et al., 2010; Masson et al., 2010; Willner et al., 2010a). Fisher’s r to z 
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transformation was then applied to convert r into a figure that is 
approximately normally distributed (e.g., Fisher’s z), which has a standard 
error of 1/√(n-3). Accordingly, an r value of .80 gives a Fisher’s z value of 
1.0986. The standard error of Fisher’s z, using a sample size of 40 is .164. 
Using a z score of 1.64 for a one sided prediction, the lower limit confidence 
interval would therefore be 1.0986 - (1.64 x 0.164) which gives a Fisher’s z 
score of 0.8362. When converted to r this gives a lower limit confidence 
interval of .68. This was deemed an acceptable lower bound 95% confidence 
interval and therefore the study aimed to recruit 40 participants.  
 
2.3.4  Ethical considerations. 
 
Ethical considerations were reviewed in accordance with the 
guidelines for minimum standards of ethical approval in psychological 
research (British Psychological Society, 2004). To avoid potential distress 
caused by task failure, four of the measures incorporated discontinue criteria 
so that continued failure resulted in test cessation. For the two measures 
with no discontinue criteria, the participant could stop at any time as 
successful performance was self determined. To avoid further distress 
through potentially overloading the participants, the assessments took place 
over two, 1 hour sessions.  
Participants were also asked for their consent to a member of staff 
completing the observer rating of executive dysfunction and made aware of 
their right to withdraw via the consent form. They were also asked to indicate 
after each session, “I liked it a lot”, “I liked it” or “I didn’t like it”. It was planned 
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that any participant who indicated ‘I didn’t like it’ would be reminded of their 
right to withdraw and their key worker would be informed. Of the 50 first 
sessions, 94% were reported as “I liked it a lot”, 6% were reported as “I liked 
it a bit” and 0% were reported as “I didn’t like it”. Of the 50 second sessions, 
93.9% were reported as “I liked it a lot”, 6.1% were reported as “I liked it a 
bit” and 0% were reported as “I didn’t like it”. 
All data were anonymised and immediately transferred to a statistical 
software spreadsheet and saved on a password protected laptop. The laptop 
and the raw data were kept in a locked draw during the data collection period 
under requirements of the Data Protection Act (1998). Ethical approval was 
obtained from Cambridge 4 Research Ethics Committee, reference number 
10/H0305/75 (Appendix G) and appropriate research governance approval 
was granted by NHS Norfolk ref 2010LD02 (Appendix H). 
 
2.4  Measures 
 
2.4.1  Supervisory attentional system. 
 
Three measures of the supervisory attentional system were employed. 
These included the MET-ID, a version of the TOLT adapted for people with 










The MET has been described in section 1.8.1. Accordingly, it was 
considered necessary to adapt the measure for an ID population. Details of 
the adaptation, piloting and scoring of the MET-ID are outlined below.  
 
2.4.1.1.2 Adaptation, pilot testing and scoring of the MET-ID. 
 
An initial version of the MET-ID was developed for pilot testing 
(Appendix I).  This was modelled as closely as possible to the Knight et al. 
(2002) and Pennington (2006) versions but modified in a number of ways. 
Firstly, the text was enlarged, simplified and spread across an A3 sheet with 
pictures added to supplement the written material. Secondly, to assist those 
with reading difficulties, auditory equipment was used to vocalize the written 
instructions. Here, a “recorderPEN”1 was adopted where the participant 
could move a “pen” over small labels placed next to text on the MET-ID 
exercise sheet, prompting the pen to read out the tasks/rules. Thirdly, the 
tasks were divided into green “doing tasks”, blue “information tasks” and a 
red “prospective memory task” to help them be easily differentiated. Fourthly, 
the green tasks (doing tasks) were reduced from six, as per Knight et al. to 
three, and the blue tasks (information tasks) were reduced from four to three. 
The rules were also reduced from nine to seven. Fifthly, participants were 
required to tell the examiner the information in the “information tasks” as 
                                            
1
 Purchased from http://www.mantralingua.com/product.php?productid=16135&js=y 
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opposed to writing it down.  This initial adaptation was piloted using eight 
participants. Data from the eight participants can be seen in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1 
Pilot data from eight participants undertaking the initial version of the MET-ID 
Participant 
number 
Site VIQ PIQ FSIQ BPVS WR MET-ID 
1 A 72 64 66 115 59 Initiated tasks 
2 A 68 55 59 118 54 Initiated tasks 
3 A 63 58 57 111 64 Initiated tasks 
4 B 57 55 53 65 3 Initiated tasks 
5  B 59 55 54 81 55 FT 
6 B 67 55 59 90 48 Initiated tasks 
7 B 63 57 57 108 90 Initiated tasks 
8 B 65 55 57 66 33 FT 
Note. BPVS = British Picture Vocabulary Scale – Third Edition; FSIQ = 
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence Full Scale IQ; FT = Failed to 
attempt any tasks; MET-ID = Multiple Errands Test – Intellectual Disability 
Version; PIQ = Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence Performance IQ; 
VIQ = Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence Verbal IQ; WR = Wechsler 
Individual Attainment Test Word Reading subtest raw score. 
 
As can be seen in Table 2.1 participants five and eight failed to initiate 
any of the tasks. Analysis of these participants’ performance showed that 
they were able to use the pen to read out the tasks however they didn’t 
actually attempt any of them. Rather, they remained stationary and when 
they had finished scrolling through the tasks looked at the examiner. 
Otherwise, participants one, two, three, four, six and seven attempted the 
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MET-ID. Analysis of these participants performance showed that all of these 
participants attempted the green doing tasks.  
However, the blue information finding tasks were only attempted by 
participants two, four, five and seven. Moreover, participants four and seven 
attempted the blue information tasks without actually going on any errands. 
For example, they estimated the number of clocks at the day centre and told 
the examiner one of the day’s activities and the date without actively seeking 
this information. Thus, these tasks were plausibly failing to tap the desired 
aspects of these participants’ executive skills. Another issue was that 
successfully completing some of the information tasks may have actually 
been dependent upon reading ability in its own right (e.g., reading the date 
and afternoon’s activity from an activities board) rather than executive 
function.  
Equally, none of the participants completed the red prospective 
memory task of “Tell Tom when five minutes has passed on the watch”. This 
was plausibly down to many participants finishing the MET-ID in under five 
minutes, but also the fact that some of the participants had difficulties telling 
the time. In addition, seven of the eight pilot participants broke the rule, “don’t 
speak to Tom unless it’s for one of the tasks” and all the participants broke 
the rule “Do all the tasks, but in any order.” 
These findings were discussed with the author’s research supervisors 
(both Clinical Psychologists) and the MET-ID was modified for a second time 
(Appendix J). Here, the blue information finding tasks were removed and 
replaced with three further green doing tasks. The red meeting or 
prospective memory task was incorporated into one of these and changed to 
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“clap your hands together after three minutes.” Successful completion of this 
task was considered to be clapping hands together any time in between two 
and four minutes. Also, in view of the information tasks being removed, the 
rule “don’t speak to Tom unless it’s for one of the tasks” was simplified to 
“don’t speak to Tom unless it’s to tell him when you have finished.”  Equally, 
to simplify the measure further, the rules “don’t carry more than one thing” 
and “don’t rush” were dropped as it was considered to be unlikely that the 
participants would carry more than one thing and difficult to objectively 
quantify whether a participant is rushing. The tasks were also coloured as 
green and the rules as red to help them be further differentiated.  
The second version was administered to five new participants that had 
not attempted the original version by initially explaining the task as outlined in 
Appendix K. As part of this process, participants were asked to revise the 
rules (with the assistance of the auditory equipment) over one minute and 
then recall them without looking at the exercise sheet. The number of rules 
recalled correctly at first attempt was recorded. Any unrecalled rules were 
subsequently prompted by the examiner and again recorded (see Appendix 
L). The participant was then reminded of any rules left unrecalled. The 
purpose of this was not a test of memory, but to ensure that the participant 
knew the rules and familiarised them with the auditory equipment.  
Likewise, in order to try and overcome the fact that some participants 
were unable to initiate any of the tasks, two practice tasks were introduced 
prior to the full administration of the MET-ID (Appendix M). The participants 
were guided through these in order to help them understand the fact that 
they had to actually initiate the tasks, rather than just scroll through them with 
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the pen. When the examiner felt that the participant had a clear grasp of the 
instructions they were asked to begin the exercise.  
Once started, the examiner followed the participant around the day 
centre at a distance of approximately two metres until the participant 
informed the examiner that they had finished. Participants carried the MET-
ID instructions and the auditory recorder pen with them whilst they were 
carrying out the task. Finally, a standard prompt was introduced when a 
participant asked a question or tried to speak to the examiner, in order to 
stop any covert support that might be inadvertently provided. This was: 
“remember, I’m not allowed to give you any help but you must do all the 
tasks and not break any of these rules”.  
This second version of the MET-ID was analyzed using the Flesch-
Kincaid readability test on Microsoft Word 2007. This returned a Flesch-
Kincaid grade level of 1.9, which means that a typically developing child in 
their second grade of the United States education system, who would 
typically be seven or eight years of age, should be able to read the MET-ID 
instructions. Five participants’ performance on the second version is outlined 











Pilot data from five participants undertaking the second version of the MET-
ID 
Participant number Site VIQ PIQ FSIQ BPVS WR 
 
MET-ID 
9 B 62 55 55 63 8 FT 
10 B 72 57 62 128 108 Initiated tasks 
11 B 57 55 54 59 24 Initiated tasks 
12 B 55 55 52 92 51 Initiated tasks 
13 B 71 59 63 131 95 Initiated tasks 
Note. BPVS = British Picture Vocabulary Scale – Third Edition; FSIQ = 
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence Full Scale IQ; FT = Failed to 
attempt any tasks; MET-ID = Multiple Errands Test – Intellectual Disability 
Version; PIQ = Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence Performance IQ; 
VIQ = Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence Verbal IQ; WR = Wechsler 
Individual Attainment Test Word Reading subtest raw score. 
 
As can be seen in Table 2.2 participant nine was the only one unable 
to initiate any of the MET-ID tasks. Her performance showed the same 
pattern of scrolling through the tasks but not actually initiating any of them, 
despite being guided through two practice tasks with the examiner only 
moments earlier. This didn’t appear to be related to any comprehension 
difficulties as her WASI verbal IQ and BPVS scores were actually higher than 
two of the other participants who were able to engage in the MET-ID tasks. 
However, her WIAT score was the lowest of all five suggesting a low level of 
reading ability that could plausibly explain her inability to initiate tasks. 
Nevertheless, this final version of the MET-ID was adopted so the task 
initiation phenomenon could be investigated further. Specifically, it was 
unclear whether the inability to initiate any tasks was down to a failure in task 
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comprehension or an executive function deficit. This is considered in section 
3.5 below. Data from these five participants were used in the final analysis. 
Recording of MET-ID performance was conducted as per Knight et al. 
(2002) where the examiner wrote down all aspects of the participants’ 
performance as they engaged in the task. An example of this is given in 
Appendix N. This written summary of performance was then scored. In 
developing a scoring system, interpretation failures and inefficiencies were 
abandoned for three reasons. Firstly, it was felt that, if a participant fails to 
actually initiate any tasks, they are less likely to break rules, make 
interpretation failures and commit inefficiencies. For example, pilot testing 
showed that many participants were giving the examiner a magazine rather 
than a book. This could have been coded as a task failure (where a task was 
not completed satisfactorily) and an interpretation failure (where a task was 
misunderstood). However, for those who didn’t attempt this task at all, this 
would have just been coded as a task failure. Therefore, the participants 
giving the examiner a magazine rather than a book would have received a 
higher error profile score (meaning worse executive function) than the 
participants who didn’t actually initiate the task at all. Secondly, it also proved 
hard to actually define and code instances of interpretation failures and 
inefficiencies before the MET-ID was actually trialled. Indeed, it appears that 
these measures could have only been defined and coded on a retrospective 
basis. As this may compromise the validity of any such recordings, no 
attempt was made to quantify them. Thirdly, interpretation failures and 
inefficiencies have been found to occur vastly less frequently than task 
failures and rule breaks (Alderman et al., 2003). 
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In view of this, two alternative scales were introduced. These included 
task attempts (where a task is attempted but not completed satisfactorily) 
and task completions (where a task is attempted and completed 
satisfactorily). Here, the task attempts category was included in order to give 
credit for task initiation, even if the task was performed incorrectly. A similar 
scale crediting task attempts was employed by Dawson et al. (2009) on their 
version of the MET-HV. Alternately, task completions were designed to credit 
both successful attempts and completions. Task completions also stood as a 
“mirror image” to task failures from the original MET, so could replace this 
scale. Both these scales were scored out of six, with one point being 
awarded for each of the six tasks. In keeping with the original MET, rule 
breaks were also recorded and scored out of six where a point was awarded 
if a rule was broken. The system used to score each of the three scales is 




As the MET has not been trialed before in an ID population, the data 
reported here are taken from its use with different samples. Whilst some of 
these data have been described in section 1.8.1 above, several statistics are 
repeated here for illustration purposes. 
In comparing MET performance across clinical groups, Knight et al. 
(2002) found that total error score on a hospital based version of the MET 
discriminated between participants with acquired brain injuries and “healthy” 
controls (t = 5.25, p < .001). This was also found by Alderman et al. (2003, t 
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= 7.18, p < .001) and Pennington (2006, t = 5.23, p < .001) on shopping 
centre and hospital ward versions of the MET respectively. 
 Moreover, in terms of ecological validity, as the MET is undertaken in 
a real life setting as opposed to the laboratory, it has potentially useful 
ecological considerations built in (see Alderman et al., 2003; Burgess et al., 
2006; Dawson et al., 2009). Accordingly, the MET has been frequently 
compared with the DEX-IR to investigate how it relates to everyday 
symptoms of executive dysfunction. Here, in samples with acquired brain 
injuries, DEX-IR total score has correlated with MET errors, (r = .69, p < .05, 
Dawson et al., 2009) and MET task failures, (r = .79, p < .001, Knight et al., 
2002), respectively, where high scores on the DEX-IR and MET indicate 
more executive dysfunction. Furthermore, Dawson et al. (2009) found that 
MET performance was related to a standardized assessment of activities of 
daily living; the Assessment of Motor and Process Skills (AMPS; Fisher & 
Bray Jones, 2010), where AMPS process score correlated with MET rule 
breaks, (r = -.69, p < .05) and MET errors (r = -.38, ns), with higher AMPS 
score relating to better performance on activities of daily living. 
In terms of convergent validity, the MET has been largely correlated 
with the BADS, as this also purports to be an ecologically sensitive measure 
of executive function. Accordingly, MET total errors have correlated with 
BADS total profile score, (r = -.57, p < .009, Knight et al., 2002; r = -.46, p < 
.01, Alderman et al., 2003; r = -.55, p < .05, Pennington, 2006) on hospital 
grounds, shopping centre and ward based versions of the MET respectively, 
where lower BADS scores relate to more executive dysfunction. In examining 
the individual BADS subtests, MET total errors have correlated with the 
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BADS Zoo Map test profile score, (rs = -.93, p < .001, Rand, Basha-Abu 
Rukan, Weiss, & Katz, 2009; r = -.46, p < .01, Alderman et al., 2003; r = -.41, 
ns, Knight et al., 2002), as well as the BADS SET profile score (r = -.41, p < 
.01, Alderman et al., 2003) in those with acquired brain injuries. The MET 
also appears to have a relationship with card sorting tests, which, whilst 
making no claims to ecological validity, have themselves been shown to be 
sensitive to frontal lobe lesions (Demakis, 2003). Here, MET total errors have 
correlated with MWCST perseverative errors (r = .67, p < .001, Knight et al., 
2002; r = .39, p < .01, Alderman et al., 2003), where higher MWCST 




Knight et al. (2002) obtained inter-rater reliability scores ranging from 
.81 to 1.00 and Dawson et al. (2009) found similar inter-rater reliability scores 
of between .71 and .88 for the different outcome measures of the MET. 
Knight et al. also found Cronbach’s alpha internal consistency reliability of 
0.77 for each outcome measure’s ability to predict MET total score. Rand et 
al. (2009) also demonstrated alternate form reliability between virtual reality 
and “real life” shopping centre versions of the MET, showing a significant 
correlation in total MET errors on both versions across a total sample of 49 









As outlined above, the SPT is a subtest from the BADS-C and a 
simplified version of the SET. Whilst the SET is undertaken in the 
“laboratory”, it is designed to “tap a subset of the same cognitive 
components” (Burgess, 2000, p. 281) that are required in the MET and 
everyday situations. Indeed, Burgess (2000) describes how many everyday 
situations such as shopping or cooking have the following features; many 
discrete tasks, merging of these tasks is necessary for efficient performance, 
only one task can be performed at a time (due to cognitive or physical 
constraints), unforeseen interruptions may occur, delayed intentions may 
need to be activated, the component tasks have differing characteristics, 
acceptable performance is self determined and no immediate feedback is 
given (e.g., failures are not immediately highlighted). Burgess explains how 
the SET contains all of the characteristics outlined above (with the exception 
of potential unforeseen interruptions) and that these characteristics tend to 
be overlooked by the majority of other neuropsychological measures. 
Specifically, the SPT has been described as a measure of “Planning, task 
scheduling and performance monitoring” (Baron, 2006, p. 540) and is 
described below.  
The SPT contains three tasks, each with two parts (six parts in total). 
The first task: “How many?” includes two booklets (parts one and two) with 
each page featuring a different number of items. The participant is required 
to state the number of items in each of the pictures. The second task: “What 
is it?” also includes two booklets (parts one and two) with a different single 
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object on each page. The participant is required to name the object in each 
picture. The third task: “Sort me” contains two boxes (parts one and two) 
each containing small objects. The participant has to put a specified type of 
small object into the lid of each respective box as indicted on the upturned 
side of the box’s lid. The test requires that the participant must attempt at 
least something from each of the six parts within a five minute time limit. 
However, a rule prevents the participant from completing two parts from the 
same task consecutively. For example, the participant cannot go directly 
from “How many?” part one to “How many?” part two without first attempting 
a part of the “What is it?” or “Sort me” tasks. The participant has a visible 
countdown timer to help them keep track of the time and a written rule sheet 
outlined in front of them. 
 
2.4.1.2.2  Administration and scoring. 
 
The SPT was administered as per the BADS-C manual, but modified 
to allow the participant to read out the answers to the “How many?” and 
“What is it?” tasks, as opposed to writing them down. The rule sheet was 
also enlarged and supplemented with pictures to assist those with reading 
difficulties.  
The maximum score available on the STP is 16. Points are scored by 
the number of tasks attempted and the strategies used by the participant to 
complete the task. Points can be lost if a participant breaks a rule on one of 
the tasks (e.g., does “How many” part one followed by “How many” part two, 
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without attempting one of the “What is it” or “Sort me” tasks in between). 
Lower score means worse executive function. 
 
2.4.1.2.3  Validity and reliability. 
 
Due to the relative dearth of available tests of EF in people with ID, 
there are no known data attesting to the validity or reliability of the SPT in an 
ID sample. However, the SPT was investigated by Willner et al. (2010a) as 
part of an investigation into the utility of measures of executive function in 40 
people with ID. They found that no participant scored at floor or ceiling level 
on the SPT (M = 3.5, SD = 1.6). The SPT also showed a medium, significant 
correlation with the TOLT, (r = .344, p < .05; P Willner, personal 
communication, July 3, 2010), where high scores on the TOLT and SPT 
indicated better performance. 
The validity of the SPT when tested by Emsile et al. (2003) indicated a 
negative correlation between the SPT and a version of the DEX-IR modified 
for children in their combined neurologically healthy and clinical sample of 
314 children (r = -.208, p < .000), where higher DEX-IR score means worse 
executive function. The SPT also showed a significant negative correlation (r 
= -.275, p < .000) with the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ; 
Goodman, 1999) total difficulties score, where higher SDQ score means 
more difficulties  
Emslie et al. (2003) also demonstrated inter-rater reliability for the 
SPT in a sample of 25 neurologically healthy participants aged 8 to 14 where 
correlations between raters for the number of tasks attempted, number of 
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rule breaks and total score ranged from .92 to 1.00 (all p < .001). Emslie et 
al. also assessed the test retest reliability of the SPT in this sample. As a 
critical aspect of tests of executive function is novelty, since it is new 
situations that people with executive problems are likely to find difficult, it was 
not expected that there would be strong test-retest reliability. Indeed, the 
samples mean score was significantly lower when re-tested three to four 
weeks after the original administration (p < .006). This is in line with findings 
of other tests of frontal lobe functioning, including the adult version of the 
BADS (Emslie et al., 2003). 
Whilst the SPT’s validity and reliability in an ID population is 
unestablished, the SPT is one of the few tests available that aims to tap the 
skills required in the MET. To this end it stands as a useful laboratory based 
measure with which to correlate MET-ID performance. 
 
2.4.1.3 The Tower of London Test. 
 
2.4.1.3.1  Description. 
 
 
The TOLT was originally developed by Shallice (1982) as a measure 
of the planning processes governed by the SAS (Andres & Van der Linden, 
2000, 2001; Ball et al., 2008; Chan et al., 2008; Marczewski, Van der Linden, 
& Larøi, 2001; Masson, et al., 2010; Rainville et al., 2002). Subsequently, the 
TOLT (or variants of it) have been incorporated into executive function 
assessment batteries such as the Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System 
(Delis, Kaplan, & Krammer, 2000) and the Cambridge Executive Function 
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Assessment (CEFA; Ball et al., 2008). As a description of the TOLT has 
been given in the introduction section, it will not be repeated here. 
 
2.4.1.3.2  Administration and scoring.  
 
The TOLT administration and scoring procedures as developed by 
Masson et al. (2010) in a study investigating the utility of the TOLT in an ID 
sample were used. The participants were initially asked to count the six discs 
to ensure that they could count to six as this was the maximum number of 
moves they would be required to use. A motor co-ordination task was then 
initially modelled by the examiner before asking the participants to place all 
six discs onto the pegs in any order. The rules were then explained and a 
two move problem was modelled by the test administrator followed by a 
practice two move problem for each participant. 
The test started with a first problem that required one move, a second 
problem that required two moves, and so forth, and ended with a sixth 
problem that required six moves. A time limit was placed on the one and two 
move problems of 30 seconds, the three and four move problems of 60 
seconds and the five and six move problems of 120 seconds. However, this 
was for pragmatic purposes, as emphasis was on accuracy rather than 
speed. Each time a rule was broken the trial was stopped, the rule break was 
pointed out and the participants were reminded of the rules. The participant 
was allowed three trials per problem. 
 A total points score (out of 18) was awarded where participants would 
get three points if they passed a problem on the first attempt, two if passed at 
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second attempt, one if passed at third and zero if not passed at third attempt. 
The number of problems solved correctly at first attempt (out of six) was also 
recorded, as well as the highest problem level achieved (out of six). Lower 
scores mean worse executive function. A discontinue rule was applied if any 
participant failed all three trials of two consecutive items. 
 
 2.4.1.3.3  Validity. 
 
As outlined above, performance on the TOLT has been shown to 
differentiate between “healthy” controls and participants with dementia 
(Rainville et al., 2002), schizophrenia (Marczewski et al., 2001) and acquired 
brain injuries (Shallice, 1982). Successful performance on the TOLT has also 
been shown to be impaired in “older” (relative to “younger”) groups (Andres & 
Van der Linden, 2000). The TOLT has also been shown to discriminate 
between those mild and moderate ID who have Down’s Syndrome (Ball et 
al., 2008).  
Masson et al. (2010) found a clear hierarchical structure where all 43 
participants with ID undertaking the TOLT were able to solve the first 
problem level but only 9 (20.9%) were able to solve the sixth and final level. 
Unfortunately, Masson et al. did not include any other “laboratory” based 
measures of executive function so convergent validity could not be 
assessed. In terms of ecological validity, Masson et al. (2002) compared 
TOLT performance with the DEX-IR and the Adaptive Behaviour Scale – 
Residential and Community: Second Edition (ABS-RC 2; Nihira et al., 1993). 
Higher ABS-RC 2 scores mean better adaptive functioning. They found that 
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the DEX-IR correlated with TOLT total score (r = -.507, p = .001), TOLT 
correct first attempts, (r = -.369, p = .015) and TOLT highest problem level 
achieved, (r = -.572, p = .001). Significant correlations were also observed 
between the ABS-RC 2 community self sufficiency scale and TOLT total 
score (r = .463, p = .002) and TOLT highest problem level achieved (r = .502, 
p = .001). ABS-RC 2 personal – social responsibility scale correlated with 
TOLT total score (r = .457, p = .002) and TOLT correct at first attempts (r = 
.442, p = .003). ABS-RC 2 social adjustment score correlated with TOLT 
highest problem level achieved (r = .458, p = .002). ABS-RC 2 personal 
adjustment score correlated with TOLT total score, (r = .472, p = .002), TOLT 
correct at first attempts, (r = .456, p = .002) and TOLT highest problem level 
achieved (r = .506, p = .001). 
 
2.4.1.3.4  Reliability. 
 
There are no known data attesting to the reliability of the TOLT in an 
ID sample. Despite this, Willner et al. (2010a) found no significant difference 
between mean total score on the TOLT in a sample of 40 people with mild to 
moderate ID and the mean score on the same test used by Ball et al. (2008) 







2.4.2  Everyday symptoms of the dysexecutive syndrome. 
 
A measure of everyday symptoms of executive dysfunction was 
required in order to assess how well the MET-ID would correlate with these 
symptoms. 
 




Burgess et al. (1996) developed the DEX as a means of assessing a 
range of symptoms associated with the dysexecutive syndrome. The DEX 
contains 20 items each responded to on a five point Likert type scale (0-4), 
asking about the degree to which an individual conforms to the specified 
items (ranging from never to very often). The DEX comes in both self and 
independent rater forms. The independent rater form (DEX-IR) was used 
here. Whilst, the DEX is based on symptoms of the dysexecutive syndrome, 
some have regarded it as a measure of the SAS (Chan et al., 2008). The 
characteristics of the dysexecutive syndrome as measured by the DEX 
questionnaire are outlined in Table 1.1 in the introduction section. 
 
2.4.2.1.2 Administration and scoring. 
 
A member of staff at the participant’s day centre was asked to 
complete the DEX-IR. The DEX-IR gives a score out of 80, with higher 






Burgess et al. (1998) found that DEX-IR ratings were significantly 
higher in 92 patients with acquired brain injury or dementia compared to 217 
neurologically healthy controls (p < .001). Burgess et al. also examined the 
relationship between the DEX questionnaire and several measures of 
executive function in the clinical sample. The measures included the 
Cognitive Estimates Test (Shallice & Evans, 1978), a Verbal Fluency Test 
(Benton, 1968), the MWCST, the SET and the Trail Making Test (Armitage, 
1946). They found significant correlations between DEX-IR scores and 
performance on all the above tests (apart from the Cognitive Estimates Test) 
between r = .29 and .40 (scores reflected where appropriate). Prior to this 
Wilson et al. (1996) demonstrated significant correlations (between r = -.31 
and -.46) across all BADS subtests and DEX-IR scores (all p < .01), where 
low BADS scores mean more impairment whereas high DEX-IR scores 
mean more impairment. They also found that BADS total profile score 
showed a significant correlation with DEX-IR score (r = -.62, p < .001).  
The only known study incorporating the DEX-IR in an ID sample is by 
Masson et al. (2010). As stated above, they found significant correlations 
between DEX-IR scores and the three TOLT outcome measures (between r 








 Bennett et al. (2005) measured the internal consistency of the DEX in 
four different groups of people. Here, a neuropsychologist, an occupational 
therapist and family members of participants with brain injuries rated 64, 45 
and 42 brain injured participants respectively on the DEX-IR. Fifty-five brain 
injured participants also rated themselves on the self report version of the 
DEX. Cronbach’s alpha coefficient scores across all groups were higher than 
.91. Inter-rater agreement on DEX-IR ratings between the neuropsychologist 
and the occupational therapist when each assessing 30 brain injured 
participants was high, r = .79, p < .01. In contrast, the correlation between 
the DEX-IR ratings of neuropsychologists and the family members of 42 
brain inured participants was lower r = .42, p < .01, as was the correlation 
between the DEX-IR ratings of occupational therapists and the family 
members of 30 brain inured participants, r = .45, p < .05. Whilst the 
correlation between the self report version of the DEX, as completed by 42 
brain injured participants correlated significantly with their families ratings of 
them on the DEX-IR, r = .68, p <.01, this was not the case for the 
neuropsychologists DEX-IR ratings across 55 brain injured participants, r = 
.24, ns, and the occupational therapists ratings across 40 brain injured 






2.4.3  Intellectual Functioning. 
 
A measure of intellectual functioning was used in order to establish 
the presence of ID in the participants. 
 




The WASI gives an abbreviated means of obtaining age adjusted 
Verbal IQ (VIQ), Performance IQ (PIQ) and Full Scale IQ (FSIQ) estimates 
for those aged 6 to 89. It contains four subtests which are alternate forms of 
the Vocabulary, Similarities, Block Design and Matrix Reasoning subtests 
from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Third Edition (WAIS-III; 
Wechsler, 1998). These subtests have been shown to load well onto the 
measurement of general intelligence (Spearman, 1927), with values of 
between .72 and .83 (Kaufman & Lichtenberger, 1999). 
 
2.4.3.1.2 Administration and scoring. 
 
The WASI takes approximately 30 minutes to administer and was 
delivered according to manual guidelines. It provides standardized scores for 
each of the subscales, including a FSIQ estimate which can be derived from 
administering either two or all four (WASI FSIQ-4) of the WASI subtests. 
WASI FSIQ-4 was used here, with a score of below 70 used to classify the 






In Children, Wechsler (1999) reports that the WASI Vocabulary, 
Similarities and Block Design subtests have demonstrated correlations 
(between r = .69 and .74) with their alternate forms from the Wechsler 
Intelligence Scale for Children – Third Edition (WISC-III; 1992). Because the 
WISC-III does not have a Matrix Reasoning subtest, this comparison could 
not be calculated. Here, WASI FSIQ-4 also correlated well with WISC-III 
FSIQ (r = .81). In adults, Wechsler (1999) reports that the WASI Vocabulary, 
Similarities, Matrix Reasoning and Block Design subtests have demonstrated 
correlations (between r = .66 and .88) with their alternate forms from the 
WAIS-III. WASI FSIQ-4 also correlated equally well with WAIS-III FSIQ (r = 
.92). 
The WASI was also administered to 119 individuals with intellectual 
disabilities. This included 57 individuals with mild mental intellectual 
disabilities, 30 individuals with moderate intellectual disabilities and 32 
individuals with Down’s Syndrome. The mild intellectual disability group 
obtained a mean WASI FSIQ-4 score of 63.28 (SD = 7.82), the moderate 
intellectual disability group obtained a mean WASI FSIQ-4 score of 56.73 
(SD = 3.74) and the Down’s Syndrome group obtained a mean WASI FSIQ-4 
score of 57.88 (SD = 4.75). Ninety seven percent of the overall sample 
obtained WASI FSIQ-4 scores of 75 or lower. This dropped to 87% of the 






For the child sample, Wechsler (1999) found the internal consistency 
across all subtests to be .87 to .92. For the adult sample, this ranged from 
.92 to .94. For the IQ scores, the average reliability coefficients for the child 
sample were .93, .94 and .96 for the VIQ, PIQ and FSIQ-4 scales 
respectively. For the adult sample, the average reliability coefficients were 
.96, .96, and .98 for the VIQ, PIQ and FSIQ-4 scales respectively. 
  Wechsler (1999) also reports test re-test reliability in the child sample 
ranging from .77 to .86 for the subtest scores, and .88 to .93 for the IQ 
scales. In the adult sample, this was between .79 to .90 for the subtests, and 
.87 to .92 for the IQ scales. Four raters were also used to assess inter-rater 
reliability by scoring 60 protocols. Across all ages, inter-rater reliability of the 
subtests and IQ scales, ranged from .77 to .92. 
 
2.4.4 Receptive vocabulary. 
 
A measure of receptive vocabulary was employed so the participants’ 












The British Picture Vocabulary Scale – third edition (BPVS-III; Dunn, 
Dunn, Styles, & Sewell, 2009) is a measure of receptive (or hearing) 
vocabulary and is regarded as an indicator of the extent of English 
vocabulary acquisition (Dunn et al., 2009). It is recommended by the authors 
for use in children with ID and special educational needs. The BPVS has 
been used in previous investigations of executive function in adults with ID 
as a measure of non executive ability (Ball et al., 2008; Willner et al., 2010a). 
 
2.4.4.1.2 Administration and scoring. 
 
The BPVS-III takes approximately 10 minutes to administer. It 
requires the examiner to show the participant a page containing four pictures 
and read out a word. The participant is required to point to the picture that 
best relates to the word. Outcome measures include raw score, age 




Dunn et al. (2009) found that the BPVS-III correlated with the 
Cognitive Ability Tests (CAT; Lohman & Hagen, 2001) Verbal Battery (r = 
.72), as well as CAT composite score (r = .61) in children, where higher 
scores on both tests mean better performance (significance values not 
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given). Dunn et al. (2009) compared 27 students with a statement of special 
educational needs with standardised scores of school students of a similar 
age without special educational needs. They found that the special 
educational needs group returned a mean BPVS-III score of 88.5 (SE = 2.6) 




No known research exists investigating the reliability of the BPVS-III in 
an ID sample. Therefore, its reliability is assumed based on the reliability of 
its predecessor (the BPVS-II) in an ID sample. Here, Glenn and Cunningham 
(2005) found a median Cronbach’s alpha of .93 and median split half 
reliability of .85. 
 
2.4.5 Reading ability. 
 
A measure of reading ability was employed so the participants’ ability 
to read the written instructions of the MET-ID instructions could be controlled 







2.4.5.1 Word Reading subtest of the Wechsler Individual 




The Word Reading subtest (WR) of the Wechsler Individual 
Attainment Test – Second UK Edition (WIAT-II; Wechsler, 2005) assesses 
the ability of the respondent‘s early reading (phonological awareness), word 
recognition and word decoding skills by asking them to read aloud lists of 
letters and words accurately. The test provides normative data from children 
aged six to adults. 
 
2.4.5.1.2 Administration and scoring. 
 
Each participant was started on item 48 where the respondent is 
required to read out whole words. The reversal rule was applied where 
participants scoring zero on any of the first three items were administered the 
preceding items in reverse order. Participants obtaining full marks on the first 
three items proceeded until the discontinue criteria of seven incorrect 




Wechsler (2005) administered the WIAT-II to 39 people aged 7 to 14 
who had a FSIQ < 70 and were diagnosed with ID. The mean standardized 
score for the WR subtest in this group was 58.14 (SD = 10.42). Eighty five % 
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of this group obtained WR scaled scores   70. A matched control group of 
participants with IQs > 70 obtained a mean standardized score of 95.68 (SD 
= 14.47). Ten percent of the matched control group obtained WR scaled 
scores   70. The difference between the mean WR subtest standardized 




Average split half reliability coefficient across ages 6 to 19 on the WR 
was .97. Across all ages, average test retest reliability of the WR was .98. 
Inter-rater reliability of all WIAT-II subtests has been found to range from .94 





For those with ID, each participant was initially approached by a 
member of staff from their day centre who was well known to them. The 
member of staff assessed the participant’s interest in taking part by 
explaining the information sheet to them. If an interest was expressed, the CI 
subsequently approached the participant to confirm their interest before 
obtaining informed consent and demographic data. Thereafter, each 
participant was asked to undertake the WASI, BPVS and the WR subtest 
from the WIAT-II in the first meeting. This took approximately one hour. The 
CI then arranged another time to meet with the participant within the 
following week, where the TOLT, SPT and MET-ID were administered. 
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Again, this second appointment lasted approximately one hour. Following 
completion of the second session the participant was thanked for their time. 
For staff asked to complete the DEX-IR, the day centre manager 
briefed the staff about the nature of the research and asked for volunteers 
who would be willing to give ratings. If an interest was expressed, the CI 
approached each member of staff individually and went over the information 
sheet, informed consent form and demographic data sheet. Staff participants 
were then asked to provide DEX-IR ratings for each ID participant until data 
from the required number was obtained. 
 
2.6 Plan of Analysis 
 
Each hypothesis is outlined below, followed by the planned analysis. 
 
1) The DEX-IR will correlate more strongly with the MET-ID scales and 
the SPT compared to the TOLT as the MET-ID and SPT are designed 
to be more predictive of the “real life” symptoms of SAS impairment. 
 
2) There will be a stronger correlation between the MET-ID scales and 
the SPT compared to the correlation between the MET-ID and the 
TOLT as the MET-ID and SPT are designed to tap a subset of the 
same cognitive components required in “real life” tasks. 
 
 
The correlations between each measure were calculated. Meng, 
Rosenthal and Rubins’s (1992) test for comparing correlated correlations 
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within a single sample was then used to assess if there were any significant 

















































This section outlines the results of the study. Initially, descriptive 
information about the sample used and data collected are presented. The 
hypotheses are then tested, followed by supplementary analysis examining 
the influence of receptive vocabulary and reading ability on MET-ID 
performance. It is concluded that none of the research hypotheses was 
supported. Equally, the receptive vocabulary, reading ability and general 
verbal abilities of the participants were strong predictors of MET-ID 
performance. However, even when receptive vocabulary, reading ability and 
general verbal abilities were partialled out, MET-ID task completions 
continued to correlate significantly with performance on the TOLT and its 
subscales, suggesting that the MET-ID has a robust relationship with this 
measure.  
 
3.2  Descriptive information about sample 
 
Only data from the 40 non-pilot participants were used in the final 
analysis. Participants were recruited from four different day centres. For the 
40 non pilot participants, four (10%) were from day centre A, 16 (40%) were 
from day centre B, 13 (32.5%) were from day centre C and seven (17.5%) 
were from day centre D. A Kruskal-Wallis test revealed no significant 
differences in mean MET-ID task attempts (H (3) = 1.878, p = .598), task 
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completions (H (3) = .224, p = .974) and rule breaks, (H (3) = 2.356, p = 
.887) across the four day centres. 
 
3.3  Descriptive data analysis 
 
Twenty five percent of the MET-ID scripts were scored by both the 
author and the author’s primary research supervisor. The intraclass 
correlation coefficient for task attempts was .885, for task completions .986 
and for rule breaks .840. For all analyses below, the scoring undertaken by 
the principal investigator was used. 
Internal consistency was calculated for each of the MET-ID subscales. 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient was .838 for task attempts and 611 for task 
completions. However, for rule breaks, Cronbach’s alpha coefficient was -
.584. Accordingly, the correlation matrix comparing the frequency with which 
the respective rule breaks were adhered to or broken revealed a high degree 
of negative relationships. For example, the rules “Do all the tasks in any 
order” and “Don’t speak to Tom unless it’s to tell him you have finished” were 
broken by 77% and 72.5% of the participants respectively. In contrast, the 
rules “Don’t walk into any staff offices,” “Don’t walk back into a room you’ve 
already been in” and “Don’t leave the day centre” were only broken by 
12.5%, 17.5% and 5% of the sample respectively. This suggests that the 
rules broken most frequently may have been difficult for the participants to 
avoid breaking (e.g., it was difficult for the participants to complete all the 
tasks and not speak to the examiner), whereas the rules that were broken 
less frequently may have been easy to adhere to (e.g., it was easy for the 
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participants to avoid walking into any staff offices, avoid walking back into a 
room and not leave the day centre). 
Another difficulty with the rule breaks measure was that, as outlined 
above, the very act of attempting the tasks makes the participant more likely 
to break rules compared to participants who fail to attempt any tasks. Thus, a 
participant who attempted many tasks may actually receive a worse error 
score profile than a participant who didn’t attempt as many as attempting 
more tasks could mean they could potentially break more rules. Accordingly, 
a positive correlation would be expected between task attempts and rule 
breaks, and task completions and rule breaks. As can be seen in Table 3.2 
this prediction occurred, where rule breaks were significantly positively 
related to task attempts and task completions. This further questions the 
validity of the rule breaks on this version of the MET-ID measure as it 
appears highly task dependent. 
In addition, the very act of being able to adhere to the rules is 
dependent on the participants’ ability to be aware of them. Whilst the 
participants were given one minute to help them learn the rules when the 
MET-ID was being explained, responses indicated that when asked to recall 
them, a mean of 2.02 out of six were spontaneously recalled correctly at first 
attempt. When the participant’s were given prompts to help them remember 
each individual rule a mean of 1.50 additional rules were recalled at second 
attempt. Thus, after both spontaneous and prompted recall, an average of 
3.52 rules were remembered by the participants prior to attempting the MET-
ID. Therefore, overall it is plausible that participants had great difficulty 
actually holding these rules in mind when completing the MET-ID (even 
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though they had the rules written down in front of them on the MET-ID 
exercise sheet when completing the task). 
Accordingly, based on its poor internal consistency, the finding that 
rule breaks were highly task dependent and the poor memory participants 
had for the rules, the rule breaks scale on this particular version of the MET 
appears to have poor reliability and validity. However, for illustration, it will 
still be used in the analysis below. 
For the remainder of the data, SPSS boxplots revealed that only 
WASI and DEX-IR scores had outliers. These included two participants with 
IQs of 69 and 70 respectively and one participant with a DEX-IR score of 67. 
Analysis of the dataset with these participants removed produced no 
meaningful influence on the results. Therefore, the data reported below has 
these outliers included. Table 3.1 shows descriptive statistics for the MET-ID 





























Task attempts 6 4 (10) 10 (25) 0 – 6 3.9 (2.1) 5 
Rule breaks 6 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 – 4 2.2 (0.8) 2 
Task completions 6 0 (0) 4 (10) 1 – 6 3.3 (1.5) 3 
SPT 16 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 – 13 6.3 (3.0) 6 
TOLT 18 0 (0) 0 (0) 2 – 17 10.5 (4.8) 10.5 
DEX-IR 80 0 (0) 0 (0) 6 – 67 30.6 (14.5) 29 
WASI 130 0 (0) 0 (0) 52 – 70 58 (4.54) 56.5 
BPVS 169 0 (0) 0 (0) 19 – 159 102 (31.2) 99.5 
WR 131 0 (0) 0 (0) 3 – 124 59.8 (36.0) 54.5 
Note. BPVS = British Picture Vocabulary Raw Score; DEX-IR = Dysexecutive 
Questionnaire Independent Rater total score; SPT = Six Parts Test total 
score; TOLT = Tower of London Test total score; WASI = Wechsler 
Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence Full Scale IQ; WR = Wechsler Individual 
Attainment Test word reading subtest total score. 
 
The degree of skewness and kurtosis for each measure is outlined in 
Appendix P. Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests for each measure 
are given in Appendix R. In sum, the MET-ID scales, WASI FSIQ and TOLT 
total scores were not normally distributed. In contrast, BPVS raw score, WR 
raw score, SPT total score and DEX-IR total score were normally distributed. 
As the MET-ID subscales were the variables of interest, non parametric 
Spearman’s correlations were used to compare the data. A correlation matrix 
between the MET-ID subscales, SPT, TOLT, DEX-IR, VIQ, PIQ, FSIQ, BPVS 
and WR scores is presented in Table 3.2.  High DEX-IR scores and MET-ID 
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rule breaks equate to worse executive function whereas high MET-ID task 





Summary of Spearman’s rho correlations between the measures used 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Task attempts -           
2. Rule breaks .438** -          
3. Task completions -.732** -.431** -         
4. SPT .214 -.150 .267* -        
5. TOLT .222 -.027 .368* .080 -       
6. DEX-IR .050 .044 .124 .142 -.016 -      
7. VIQ .328* .238 .354* .291 -.116 -.099 -     
8.  PIQ .000 -.017 .067 .088 .379* -.306 .206 -    
9.  FSIQ .190 .061 .243 .282 .335* -.344* .481** .887** -   
10. BPVS .392* .102 .432** .258 .219 -.142 .451** .358* .465** -  
11. WR .346* .087 .257 .231 -.046 -.285 .576** .306 .492** .351* - 
Note. Significance values above the dotted line are one tailed. Significance values below the dotted line are two tailed. BPVS = British Picture 
Vocabulary Scale Score; DEX-IR = Dysexecutive Questionnaire Independent Rater total score; FSIQ = Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of 
Intelligence Full Scale IQ; PIQ = Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence Performance IQ; SPT = Six Parts Test total score; TOLT = Tower 
of London Test total score; VIQ = Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence Verbal IQ; WR = Wechsler Individual Attainment Test – Second 
Edition Word Reading subtest total score. 
*  p < .05  
**  p < .01
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3.4  Main research questions 
 
The hypotheses are now reviewed and tested in turn. 
 
1) The DEX-IR will correlate more strongly with the MET-ID scales and 
the SPT compared to the TOLT as the MET-ID and SPT are designed 
to be more predictive of the “real life” symptoms of SAS impairment. 
 
As can be seen in Table 3.2, the correlations between the DEX-IR and 
measures of executive function were all small and non-significant. When the 
subscales of the DEX-IR were correlated with these measures, there were 
again no significant relationships. Accordingly, testing hypothesis one is 
unnecessary because the hypothesis was not supported. 
 
2) There will be stronger correlations between the MET-ID scales and 
the SPT compared to the correlation between the MET-ID and the 
TOLT, as the MET-ID and SPT are designed to tap a subset of the 
same cognitive components required in “real life” tasks. 
 
As can be seen in Table 3.2, only MET-ID task completions correlated 
significantly with the SPT and the TOLT and the correlation between task 
completions and the TOLT was numerically higher than the correlation 
between task completions and the SPT. Therefore, again testing hypothesis 




3.5  Additional data analysis 
 
In order to control for the effects of IQ (WASI VIQ, PIQ and FSIQ), 
receptive vocabulary (BPVS score) and reading ability (WR score) on MET-
ID performance, the correlation matrix was analysed to assess whether any 
of these variables was related to MET-ID performance. As can be seen in 
Table 3.2, VIQ was found to be significantly correlated with MET-ID task 
attempts and task completions. Also, receptive vocabulary (BPVS score) was 
found to be significantly correlated with MET-ID task attempts and task 
completions. Equally, reading ability (WR score) was found to be significantly 
correlated with task attempts. 
Accordingly, Table 3.2 was re-consulted to assess if the IQ, BPVS 
and/or WR scores that correlated with the MET-ID scales, also correlated 
with the other measures of executive function. This was to test if these third 
variables (e.g., IQ, BPVS and/or WR scores) accounted for some of the 
variance in the correlations between the measures of executive function. 
Only if these third variables correlated with both the MET-ID scales and the 
SPT, DEX-IR and/or TOLT would they be included in this analysis, as it 
would be likely that the third variables were influencing performance on both 
the measures and therefore would account for some of the variance in the 
correlations between the MET-ID and the executive function tests. 
Accordingly, when one tailed significance tests were applied to the 
correlations below the dotted line in Table 3.2, BPVS score was found to be 
significantly related to MET-ID task completions (rs = .432, p = .003, one 
tailed) and SPT score (rs = .258, p = .038, one tailed). On top of this, VIQ 
was also found to correlate with both MET-ID task completions (rs = .354, p = 
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.012, one tailed) and SPT score (rs = .291, p = .034, one tailed). Therefore, a 
partial correlation was conducted to control for the effects of BPVS score and 
VIQ on the relationship between MET-ID task completions and the SPT. As  
SPSS 19 does not allow partial correlations to be carried out on a 
Spearman’s correlation, the data were manually ranked and a Pearson’s 
correlation (on which SPSS 19 does allow for the partialling out of the 
variables) was carried out on the ranked data. When BPVS score and VIQ 
were simultaneously partialled out, the relationship between MET-ID task 
completions and the SPT was no longer significant (rs  = .134, p = .211, one 
tailed). Thus, when the effects of BPVS score and VIQ were controlled for, 
the relationship between MET-ID task completions and SPT performance 
disappeared, suggesting that receptive vocabulary and general verbal 
abilities were having a strong influence on the participants’ ability to perform 
well on both these scales. 
Whilst, BPVS score and VIQ did not correlate significantly with the 
TOLT total score, an additional analysis was conducted to assess the 
influence of these variables (as well and WR score) on the significant 
positive correlation between MET-ID task completions and the TOLT total 
score. This was in order to test the degree to which receptive vocabulary, 
reading ability and general verbal skills were influencing the robustness of 
this relationship. When BPVS, WR score and VIQ scores were 
simultaneously partialled out, the relationship between MET-ID task 
completions and TOLT total score actually strengthened (rs = .379, p = .010, 
one tailed). In exploring the relationship between the MET-ID and the 
subscales of the TOLT, MET-ID task completions correlated significantly with 
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TOLT highest problem level achieved, (rs = .328, p = .019, one tailed) and 
TOLT correct first attempts (rs = -.393, p = .006, one tailed). When BPVS, 
WR and VIQ scores were simultaneously partialled out from these 
correlations, the relationships again strengthened. Here, Spearman’s 
correlations indicated that MET-ID task completions correlated significantly 
with TOLT highest problem level achieved (rs = .351, p = .017, one tailed) 
and TOLT correct first attempts (rs = .417, p = .005, one tailed). This 
suggests that the relationship between MET-ID task completions and the 
TOLT is robust. 
An alternate area of interest was the explanation as to why some 
participants were able to initiate tasks whereas others were not. As outlined 
above, this could have plausibly been down to failures in task 
comprehension or, alternately, an executive deficit that prevented 
participants from being able to formulate plans to initiate any of the tasks. To 
investigate this, it was hypothesised that lower scores in receptive 
vocabulary and reading ability (BPVS and WR scores respectively) in those 
who were unable to initiate any tasks would support a failure in task 
comprehension. This was based on the reasoning that poor receptive 
vocabulary would have meant that certain participants were unable to 
understand the task instructions when explained to them by the examiner or 
when vocalised by the auditory equipment, and poor reading ability would 
have meant that certain participants would have been unable to read the 
tasks/rules on the MET-ID exercise sheet adequately. In contrast, lower 
scores on the measures of executive function in those who were unable to 
initiate any of the tasks would support the notion of these participants 
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suffering from an executive deficit, thus accounting for their poorer 
performance on the MET-ID. Accordingly, participants were divided into two 
groups based on whether they were able to initiate tasks or not. Participants 
were allocated to the “non initiators” group if they (a) failed to initiate any 
tasks at all or (b) only initiated the “tell the examiner when you have finished” 
task without attempting any other tasks. Participants were ascribed to the 
“initiators” group if they initiated two or more tasks.  
 Out of the final 40 participants, a total of nine comprised the non 
initiators group. The remaining 31 participants comprised the initiator group.  
One tailed tests were used to assess the aforementioned hypotheses. A 
Mann-Whitney U test showed that BPVS score in non initiators (Mdn = 
91.00) was lower than initiators (Mdn = 115.00) and that this difference was 
significant (U = 82, z = -1.863, p = .031, one tailed). Non initiators (Mdn = 
26.00) were also significantly lower than initiators (Mdn = 75.00) on WR 
score (U = 78, z = -1.992, p = .023, one tailed). There were however no 
significant differences in TOLT, SPT, DEX-IR, WASI FSIQ and PIQ scores 
between the two groups. Despite this, the difference between VIQ was 
significantly lower in non initiators (Mdn = 55) compared to initiators (Mdn = 
55, U = 96, z = -1.694, p = .041, one tailed). Overall therefore, it appears that 
deficits in non responders reading comprehension, receptive vocabulary and 
VIQ compromised their capability to understand the requirements of the 





3.6  Summary of data analysis 
 
The hypotheses of the study were not supported. The DEX-IR failed to 
correlate more strongly with the MET-ID scales and the SPT in comparison 
to the TOLT. Equally, the MET-ID scales failed to correlate more strongly 
with the SPT compared with the TOLT. Nevertheless, MET-ID task 
completions were significantly correlated with performance on both the SPT 
and the TOLT, where better SPT and TOLT performance meant more MET-
ID task completions. Despite this, both MET-ID task completions and SPT 
performance correlated significantly with BPVS score and VIQ. When BPVS 
score and VIQ were partialled out, the correlation between the MET-ID and 
the SPT disappeared suggesting that receptive vocabulary and general 
verbal abilities were influencing the relationship between MET-ID task 
completions and the SPT. However, partialling out BPVS score, WR score 
and VIQ had no effect on the relationship between MET-ID task completions 
and the TOLT and its subscales suggesting that receptive vocabulary, 
reading ability and general verbal abilities were not influencing the 
relationship between MET-ID task completions and the TOLT.  Nevertheless, 
when the scores of those who were unable to initiate any MET-ID tasks were 
analysed, the data showed that these participants had poorer BPVS, WR 
and VIQ scores compared to those who were able to initiate the tasks. Thus, 
overall, the MET-ID has a robust executive component as evidenced by its 
relationship with the TOLT. However, perhaps unsurprisingly it also loads 





Chapter Four: Discussion 
4.1  Overview  
 
This chapter discusses the findings of the study. Initially, the research 
hypotheses are evaluated in the context of the wider literature and additional 
findings are discussed. The strengths and weaknesses of the methodology 
are then reviewed with specific consideration given to the design, measures, 
sample and procedure adopted by the study. Recommendations for how the 
research needs to be improved and developed are then given. The 
theoretical implications of the results are then discussed, making reference 
to the degree to which the findings can be conceptualised within the SAS 
and/or Duncan’s theory of goal neglect. Potential for the adaptation of 
specific clinical interventions that stem from these theories for people with ID 
is then considered. Finally, the section concludes that the MET-ID needs 
further development and adaptation to make it better suited to an ID 
population. Nevertheless, the findings of this preliminary study offer 
directions for the future development of measures of EF for people with ID, 
as well as useful theoretical insights for potential interventions that could be 
adapted to help improve executive abilities in people with ID. 
 
4.2  Evaluation of research hypotheses 
 
This section considers each research hypothesis in turn and summarises 




1) The DEX-IR will correlate more strongly with the MET-ID scales and 
the SPT compared to the TOLT as the MET-ID and SPT are designed 
to be more predictive of the “real life” symptoms of SAS impairment. 
 
There was no support for hypothesis one. The correlations between 
the DEX-IR and all other measures of EF were small and non significant. 
This is out of context with the wider literature in both ID and non ID samples 
where the DEX-IR has been shown to correlate significantly with the MET, 
SPT and TOLT (Chan, 2001; Dawson et al., 2009; Emsile et al., 2003; Knight 
et al., 2002; Masson et al., 2010). This finding therefore limits the claims the 
MET-ID can make towards being an ecologically sensitive measure of the 
SAS. 
Nevertheless, other research has shown that the DEX-IR does not 
always correlate well with measures of EF. For example, in a brain injured 
sample Norris and Tate (2000) found that the DEX-IR shared small to 
medium positive correlations (the opposite direction to that expected) with 
four subtests from the BADS (including the SET) and BADS total profile 
score. The potential reasons behind why the DEX-IR may not consistently 
correlate with measures of EF, as found in this study, are discussed in 
section 4.4.2.4 below. 
 
2) There will be a stronger correlation between the MET-ID scales and 
the SPT compared to the correlation between the MET-ID and the 
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TOLT as the MET-ID and SPT are designed to tap a subset of the 
same cognitive components required in “real life” tasks. 
 
There was no support for hypothesis two. Whilst the correlations 
between the MET-ID scales and the measures of EF all fell in the anticipated 
directions, the correlations between the MET-ID scales and the SPT were 
not significantly stronger than the correlations between the MET-ID scales 
and the TOLT. Moreover, it was only MET-ID task completions that shared 
significant correlations with both the SPT and the TOLT, and the correlations 
between the MET-ID and the TOLT were actually (non significantly) stronger 
than the correlation between the MET-ID and the SPT. This finding is 
theoretically disappointing for the MET-ID because, the original versions of 
the MET and SPT were designed to be sensitive to impairments of the SAS 
that are not readily picked up by traditional neuropsychological assessments 
(such as the TOLT) as well as tap a subset of the same cognitive 
components (Burgess, 2000; Shallice & Burgess, 1991). Therefore, it was 
expected that the MET-ID should share a stronger correlation with the SPT 
than the TOLT. The fact that this failed to occur suggests that the MET-ID 
and SPT may need further adaptation to improve their ability to be 
ecologically sensitive measures of the SAS in an ID population. 
Equally, despite being statistically significant, the correlations between 
MET-ID task completions and the SPT and TOLT (before controlling for 
confounding variables) were only small to medium in strength. Nevertheless, 
Field (2009) emphasises the importance of interpreting such effect sizes 
within the context of the wider research literature. Indeed, Burgess and 
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Robertson (2002) outline how correlations between performance on different 
executive tasks in both neurological and healthy samples are typically low 
(e.g., Duncan et al., 1997; Emslie et al., 2003; Myakie et al., 2000; Norris & 
Tate, 2000; Robbins, 1998). Therefore, the strength of the correlations 
observed here are not out of context with those observed between executive 
tests in other populations. The implications of these findings are discussed in 
sections 4.4.2.1 and 4.6 below. 
 
4.3 Additional findings 
 
Further analysis was used to control for the effect of receptive 
vocabulary and reading comprehension on MET-ID performance. Here, 
reading ability was significantly positively correlated with the number of MET-
ID tasks attempted. Equally, receptive vocabulary was significantly positively 
correlated with the number of MET-ID tasks attempted and tasks completed. 
It was also found that general verbal abilities (VIQ) were significantly 
positively correlated with MET-ID tasks attempted and tasks completed.  
Furthermore, it was found that both receptive vocabulary and general 
verbal abilities correlated significantly with both MET-ID task completions 
and SPT score. When these potentially confounding variables were 
controlled, the correlation between MET-ID task completions and the SPT 
weakened to the degree that it was no longer significant. This suggests that 
these abilities had a strong influence on the relationship between the MET-ID 
and the SPT. In contrast, whilst no potentially confounding variables 
correlated with both MET-ID task completions and the TOLT, simultaneously 
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controlling for these variables (e.g., receptive vocabulary, reading ability and 
general verbal abilities) in the relationship between MET-ID task completions 
and the TOLT (and it’s subscales) did not influence the strength of the 
relationship. This suggests that the relationship between MET-ID task 
completions and the TOLT is robust.  
Accordingly, further analysis was conducted to assess if there was a 
difference between participants who were unable to initiate any tasks on the 
MET-ID compared with those who were. Results showed that those who 
were unable to initiate any tasks scored lower on receptive vocabulary, 
reading ability and general verbal abilities compared to both the sample as a 
whole. Whilst this may be unsurprising, as it has been noted that it would be 
very difficult to design a measure of executive function that doesn’t tap areas 
such as language (Baddeley et al., 1997), the above findings suggest that 
MET-ID performance is heavily reliant on receptive vocabulary and reading 
ability. 
 




The study used a cross sectional, correlational design using a single 
sample of participants with ID so that measures of the SAS could be 
compared with observer ratings of executive function. This design had a 
number of strengths. Firstly, the correlational approach allowed for potentially 
confounding variables to be assessed and controlled in the analysis. This 
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allowed firm conclusions to be drawn about the extent to which the MET-ID 
was measuring executive function over and above reading ability and 
receptive vocabulary, as well as the influence these variables had on the 
relationship between the MET-ID scales and the alternate measures of EF. 
The use of Meng et al.’s (1992) z test for comparing correlated 
correlations would have also allowed hypotheses to be tested about whether 
the MET-ID correlated more strongly with one variable over another. This 
would potentially have allowed firm conclusions to be drawn about the 
strengths of the correlation coefficients, had the results lent themselves to 
this analysis. 
Moreover, correlating the executive function measures with the DEX-
IR allowed an estimate of the degree to which the measures predict the 
participant’s behaviour in real life. This enabled firm conclusions to be drawn 
about the ecological validity of the measures, which is an increasingly 




To assess executive function, the study employed an adapted version 
of the MET (MET-ID), the SPT, an adapted version of the TOLT and the 
DEX-IR. These measures were chosen because they have been specifically 
developed as tests of the SAS (Chan et al., 2008). However, due to the 
relative scarcity of measures specifically developed to test the SAS in an ID 
population, conclusive data on the reliability and validity of these measures in 
an ID population is largely un-established. Accordingly, these issues are 
122 
 
discussed immediately below, along with the respective strengths and 
weaknesses of the measures. 
 
4.4.2.1  The MET-ID. 
 
 
The MET-ID, as developed here, has a number of strengths. Firstly, 
this was the only known study in which the same version of the MET has 
been applied across a range of different environments. There proved to be 
no differences in MET-ID scores across the four different day centres. This is 
encouraging as a test for the future development and utility of the MET will 
be its ability to be administered in a consistent way across a range of 
settings.  
Indeed, adapting the MET-ID for day centres was useful because 
these are easily accessible, safe and convenient environments for 
psychologists to assess the real world cognitive abilities of people with ID. 
Accordingly, such assessment can afford psychologists a much richer 
understanding of how an individual’s cognitive skills operate outside of 
structured, office based settings and provide useful quantitative and 
qualitative information to support formulation, intervention and re-
assessment. 
In many cases, the use of auditory equipment to vocalise the written 
instructions of the MET-ID also helped to circumvent the difficulties faced by 
many of those who were unable to read the MET-ID instructions. This is 
encouraging for the development of the MET-ID as it shows that such 
equipment can support the ability of people with ID to operate independently 
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in unstructured environments, which is a key part of the MET-ID assessment 
procedure. 
It should also be noted that MET-ID task completions shared a robust 
relationship with the TOLT and its subscales. This is encouraging for the 
MET-ID because the TOLT is possibly one of the most widely used 
measures of EF in people with ID suggesting that it is a highly accessible 
measure for this population (Adams & Oliver, 2010; Ball et al., 2008; Masson 
et al., 2010; Willner et al., 2010a). Thus, the fact that the TOLT correlates 
well with MET-ID task completion suggests that an (in)ability to initiate tasks 
on the MET-ID may be tapping a specific executive process in people with ID 
(see sections 4.5 and 4.6 below). 
Despite this, as previously mentioned, the fact that the correlation 
between MET-ID task completions and the SPT disappeared when receptive 
vocabulary (BPVS) and general verbal abilities (VIQ) were controlled is 
clinically and theoretically disappointing for the MET-ID. This is because both 
measures are designed to be ecologically sensitive and tap a subset of the 
same cognitive components of the SAS (Burgess, 2000; Shallice & Burgess, 
1991). Therefore, the lack of correlation between them suggests that they 
may not be performing these functions in the present sample. Equally, 
despite the fact that MET-ID task completions correlated well with the TOLT, 
the TOLT has been criticised for its lack of ecological validity (Burgess et al., 
2006; Burgess & Robertson, 2002, see also section 4.4.2.3 below). 
Therefore, beyond “face” ecological validity, there remain unanswered 
questions about the extent to which the MET-ID does tap executive skills in 
the real world, especially in view of the fact that it failed to correlate with the 
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DEX-IR (notwithstanding the DEX-IR’s unestablished validity and reliability in 
an ID sample, see section 4.4.2.4). 
Nevertheless, in terms of reliability, scoring of the written scripts taken 
from MET-ID performance showed a high degree of inter-rater agreement 
across the MET-ID scales with the lowest interclass correlation coefficient 
being .840 for task completions. Equally, internal consistency for task 
attempts was high (.838). However, it was relatively moderate for task 
completions (.611). Nevertheless, for rule breaks, internal consistency was 
poor (-.584). As outlined above, this is likely to be because approximately 
75% of the sample broke the rules “Do all the tasks in any order” and “Don’t 
speak to Tom unless it’s to tell him you have finished” whereas the rules 
“Don’t walk into any staff offices,” “Don’t walk back into a room you’ve 
already been in” and “Don’t leave the day centre” were each only broken by 
less than 20% of the sample. This discrepancy between high frequency and 
low frequency rule breaks lead to a number of negative correlations across 
the frequency with which the rule breaks were committed (e.g., some rule 
breaks were committed a lot, whereas others were rarely committed at all), 
hence the poor internal consistency. 
Another problem with the rule breaks measure was that the 
participants had a poor memory for the rules after they had been specifically 
asked to learn and remember them. Thus, if the participants were not aware 
of, easily forgot or were unable to read the rules when completing the MET-
ID, it is unsurprising that they may be liable to breaking some of them (even 
though they did have the rules written in front of them and could use the pen 
to vocalise them when they were executing the task). This is unfortunate for 
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the MET-ID as the rule breaks scale has been shown to correlate with 
various measures of executive function (Alderman et al., 2003; Knight et al., 
2002) as well as being predicative of distinctive dysexecutive symptoms 
(Alderman et al., 2003). This suggests that rule breaks can be a highly 
clinically useful scale and it is unfortunate that an acceptable degree of 
performance was not captured here. Thus, the rules of the MET-ID need 
further adaptation in order to make rule breaks a more clinically useful scale 
(see section 4.5 below). 
 
4.4.2.2  The SPT. 
 
The SPT was chosen for this study because of the theoretical 
relationship between the SET (the adult version of the SPT) and the MET 
(Burgess, 2000; Shallice and Burgess, 1991). The SPT was used (rather 
than the SET) because it is taken from the BADS-C and was therefore 
considered to be a more developmentally appropriate measure. 
Psychometrically, the SPT had some strength in this sample. The scores 
were normally distributed and there were no floor or ceiling effects.   
However, whilst the SPT was designed to be used with children, its 
validity in an ID sample is un-established. Indeed, the only known 
investigation examining the SPT in an ID sample was by Willner et al. 
(2010a), as part of a wider investigation into the CEFA and the BADS-C. As 
outlined above, Willner and colleagues found that the SPT shared a small 
but significant correlation with the TOLT. However, in the present sample, no 
meaningful correlation was found between the SPT and the TOLT. Moreover, 
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whilst Emslie et al. (2003) found the SPT to have a medium, significant 
correlation with the children’s version of the DEX, there was no meaningful 
relationship between the SPT and the DEX-IR in this sample. Equally, 
qualitative observation of the participant’s performance suggested that this 
task was poorly understood by the participants. Although every effort was 
made to ensure that the participants understood the requirements of the 
task, explaining the SPT is a long verbal procedure and it was subjectively 
felt that the majority of participants failed to grasp what they were being 
asked to do. For example, only one participant actually managed to complete 
the whole task without breaking the rule, despite all participants being made 
explicitly aware of it. Accordingly, the SPT is likely to need further adaptation 
to be optimally accessible for this client group. 
 
4.4.2.3  The TOLT. 
 
The TOLT was chosen for this study because of its theoretical 
underpinnings and popularity within the ID literature (Adams & Oliver, 2010; 
Ball et al., 2008; Masson et al., 2010; Willner et al., 2010a). In the present 
study, TOLT scores were not normally distributed. However, no floor or 
ceiling effects were apparent. Equally, as stated, the TOLT and its subscales 
shared a robust relationship with MET-ID task completions. This is surprising 
because such relationships failed to transpire when the MET has been 
compared with the TOLT in alternate populations (Knight et al., 2002). In 
contrast, the TOLT failed to correlate with the DEX-IR in this study. This runs 
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contrary to alternate work in which the TOLT has shown a robust relationship 
with the DEX-IR (Masson et al., 2010).  
 Subjective observation of TOLT performance suggests that most (if 
not all) participants were able to engage with and understand the task. The 
administration procedure outlined by Masson et al. (2010) allowed the 
participants to complete the task in a way that is scaffolded by the examiner 
(e.g., the participant works through progressive degrees of difficulty and the 
examiner provides immediate verbal feedback whenever a rule is broken). 
Whilst this makes it highly accessible for an ID population, very few (if any) 
real life situations pose executive demands that progressively increase in 
difficulty and have immediate environmental feedback. Therefore, the face 
ecological validity of the TOLT continues to be in question (Burgess et al., 
2006; Burgess & Robertson, 2002). 
 
4.4.2.4  The DEX-IR. 
 
The DEX-IR was used in this study to assess how representative the 
executive measures were of everyday symptoms of executive dysfunction. 
None of the measures of the SAS correlated meaningfully with the DEX-IR. 
Accordingly, several potential reasons could explain this. Firstly, the DEX-IR 
may not be a valid measure in an ID sample as it was originally designed for 
neurological samples. Otherwise, the study used employees of the day 
centres as informants on DEX-IR. Whilst these people were expected to 
have a good knowledge of and familiarity with the participant, it is very 
difficult to ascertain whether people completing the DEX-IR are doing it with 
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the same degree of awareness and understanding of the participants’ 
behaviours (Chaytor et al., 2006; Norris and Tate, 2000). Indeed, the inter-
rater-reliability of the DEX-IR is likely to vary depending on the person doing 
the rating. For example, Bennett et al. (2005) found that the DEX-IR ratings 
of neuropsychologists and occupational therapists in assessing brain injured 
participants correlated significantly with BADS total score, whereas there 
were no significant correlations between the DEX-IR ratings of the brain 
injured participant’s family members and the brain injured participant’s self 
report DEX ratings with BADS total score. Bennett et al. therefore suggested 
that the DEX-IR can only be used confidently as a screening instrument to 
identify executive dysfunction if it is completed by a professional trained to be 
sensitive to the cognitive and behavioural symptoms of the dysexecutive 
syndrome. It is unlikely that the people completing the DEX-IR in this study 
had a firm grasp of this. Moreover, Bennett et al. also point out that the DEX-
IR does not identify time frame (e.g., behaviours shown over the last week or 
last year for example) nor the frequency with which the behaviours are 
shown (e.g., once per day or once per year etc). This can again distort the 
ratings and possibly explain why they failed to correlate with the measures 
used in this study. Accordingly, alternate measures of real life abilities may 
be more appropriate (see section 4.5 below). 
 
 4.4.3 Sample. 
 
The sample size was consistent with other investigations of executive 
function in people with ID (Dymond et al., 2010; Masson et al., 2010; Willner 
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et al., 2010a). Ethical issues in recruitment associated with acquiescence 
were overcome by asking a key worker to go over the study information 
sheet with the participants prior to their formal contact with the researcher. 
Equally, day centre managers were asked to put forward participants who 
were judged to be able to give informed consent, thus further reducing the 
potential for acquiescence to occur. Collection of the data from day centres 
also allowed for informant report data on the DEX-IR to be readily collected. 
Use of the WASI also enabled precise screening to be carried out to ensure 
that participants were in the mild ID range (FSIQ < 50 and > 70). Equally, the 
sample excluded potential participants with dementia, schizophrenia and/or 
brain injury, as these have been shown to impair the SAS independent of ID 
(Andrés & Van der Linden, 2001; Marczewski et al., 2001; Perry & Hodges, 
1999).  
 Nevertheless, a potential design problem arising from the sampling of 
this study was that participants would have been attending day centres on 
the basis that they are likely to struggle with many of the cognitive skills 
required in everyday tasks, thus necessitating involvement with day services. 
This may therefore have meant that the sample included participants who 
were at the more limited scale of the mild ID range and overlooked 
participants, who for example, have the cognitive skills that do not require 








A potential problem with the recruitment procedure was that 
participants were put forward for the study by recommendation of their day 
centre manager on the basis that they would be able to give informed 
consent. However, participants who can engage in the decision making 
processes required to give informed consent may actually demonstrate 
better EF (see Willner, Bailey, Parry & Dymond, 2010b). Therefore, 
participants put forward for the study may have been at the higher range of 
executive functioning, albeit within this potentially more globally cognitive 
impaired day services sample. Taken together, these issues suggest that 
caution be exercised in generalising the findings. 
 
4.5 How can the research be improved and developed 
 
There are a number of ways in which the MET-ID reported here needs 
to be improved and developed. Initial pilot testing was carried out to ensure 
that the MET-ID could capture an appropriate range of performance for an ID 
sample. However, due to the time constraints involved in this piece of work, 
the measure finally settled on here was only modified once from its original 
conception. Thus, it is likely that several further modifications would have 
benefitted the measure used here. 
For example, based on its poor internal consistency, the finding that 
rule breaks were highly task dependent and the poor memory participants 
had for the rules, the rule breaks scale failed to capture an appropriate range 
of errors for it to be a clinically meaningful scale. Here, it was not clear that 
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the participants had an obvious memory for or awareness of the rules (even 
though they did have the rules in front of them when they were carrying out 
the MET-ID) as nearly all participants broke the rules of speaking to the 
examiner and not attempting all the tasks. Accordingly, having to be mindful 
of six rules may have loaded too heavily on working memory demands so the 
participants found it difficult to bear them in mind or check them whilst 
completing the tasks. Indeed, such practice (doing tasks whilst checking 
rules) may itself present a “dual task” scenario (Baddeley et al., 1997, Della 
Sala et al., 2010) or tap “switching” or “set shifting” skills that load onto 
executive abilities and may be problematic for people with ID (Ball et al. 
2008; Danielson et al., 2010; Kittler et al., 2008; Lanfranchi et al., 2011). 
Therefore, it may be useful to reduce the rules of the MET-ID to ensure that 
they are not overloading the participant’s working memory or ability to shift 
set in order to attain an appropriate range of performance on this scale. 
Here, it might be useful to remove the “Don’t walk inside the reception”, 
“Don’t walk inside any staff offices” and “Don’t leave the day centre” rules. 
This is because many participants are unlikely to leave the day centre or 
walk inside staff offices as a matter of course, regardless of whether they are 
taking part in the MET-ID or not. Moreover, reducing the rules to three is 
consistent with the above findings that after being asked to learn the MET-ID 
rules for one minute, the mean number of rules spontaneously recalled was 
2.02, which rose to 3.52 after the rules were cued. Therefore the use of just 
three rules might be a more manageable amount for the participants to hold 
in working memory. On top of this, introducing a post MET-ID measure 
asking how many of the rules the participants could remember might be 
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useful to gain an understanding of the extent to which the participants were 
aware of the rules when they were undertaking the task to evaluate the 
validity of this scale further. 
Nevertheless, to ensure that the MET-ID is still able to capture an 
appropriate range of performance, it might be beneficial to increase the 
number of tasks to offset the reduction in rules. As task completions 
appeared to be the most clinically useful scale (where some participants 
were able to complete all the tasks, some neglected some whereas others 
were unable to initiate any tasks at all) then this might provide further clinical 
and theoretical insights (see below) about the participant’s executive 
function. Moreover, increasing the tasks should not technically overload the 
participant’s working memory as more tasks would not necessarily mean 
having to switch between tasks and rules, thus avoiding a dual task or set 
shifting effect. 
 A further difficulty with the MET-ID was its reliance on receptive 
vocabulary, reading ability and general verbal abilities. Whilst, as stated, it 
would be very difficult to design a “pure” measure of executive function that 
doesn’t recruit other cognitive skills, the results showed that the MET-ID did 
correlate meaningfully with these variables. This is perhaps unavoidable. 
However, these findings may be pronounced because there were relatively 
few measures of executive function use to correlate with MET-ID 
performance. Unfortunately, due to the constraints involved in collecting the 
required quantity of data in the time available, additional measures of 
executive function could not pragmatically be employed in this study. 
However, such additional measures would be useful because two of the 
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measures of executive function used here (the SPT and the DEX-IR) have 
not been widely explored in or designed for ID populations. This might 
explain why there was a lack of correspondence between these measures 
and the MET-ID. In contrast, the version of the TOLT used here was 
designed for an ID population and did correlate with the MET-ID. Therefore, 
other specific measures of executive function that have been developed for 
an ID population, such as the subtests from the CEFA, may be more 
appropriately compared with the MET-ID. Indeed, there are six explicit 
executive function measures on the CEFA which Ball et al. (2008) regard as 
tapping the functions of initiation, set shifting, working memory, efficient 
organisation of retrieval and recall, response inhibition, abstracting common 
principles and planning. Correlating the MET-ID with these measures may 
allow further exploration of the specific executive component(s) of the MET-
ID, above and beyond receptive vocabulary, reading ability and general 
verbal abilities. 
However, in doing this it is important to bear in mind that the subtests 
from the CEFA were not adapted with ecological validity in mind. Therefore, 
it would be useful for future research to adapt further laboratory based 
measures that can prove to be ecologically sensitive for ID populations. 
Adaptation of the subtests from the BADS-C may be a good starting point for 
this and work on the Hotel Task by Manly, Hawkins, Evans, Woldt, and 
Robertson (2002) in brain injured participants provides a good example of 
how this can be done. Such measures might provide a better way of 
assessing real world executive skills in the laboratory and be better suited for 
correlating with MET-ID performance. 
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Equally, for the MET-ID to truly back up its claims to be an 
ecologically valid assessment it needs to show correlations with measures of 
real world function. This study has found that the DEX-IR questionnaire may 
not be best suited for this purpose in an ID sample. Otherwise, the use of an 
alternate informant based questionnaire such as the Vineland Adaptive 
Behaviour Scales – Second Edition (Sparrow, Cicchettti, & Balla, 2005) may 
been a useful option as this assesses real world behaviours (e.g., 
communication, daily living, motor skills and socialisation) and is specifically 
designed for an ID population. 
Additional problems with the study are evident in the sample used. As 
stated above, the participants were taken from what might have been the 
higher range of a potentially more globally impaired sample of people 
attending day services. This means that it is difficult to generalise the 
findings to those people with ID who do not attend day services who (by 
virtue of the fact that they don’t attend day services) might be less cognitively 
impaired. On top of this, it is likely that it would be impractical for 
psychologists to assess people on the version of the MET-ID developed here 
(that is explicitly designed for day centres) for people who do not attend a 
day centre due to potential difficulties accessing the day centre for non 
members. Therefore, future research might focus on developing a version of 
the MET-ID than can be carried out within the examinees home as it is likely 
that many potential participants (whether attending a day service or not) 
would live in a residential setting in which they could be assessed, thus 





4.6  Theoretical implications 
 
The finding from this study that had the most overt theoretical 
implication is the robust relationship between MET-ID task completions and 
the TOLT. The reasons why the completion of specific tasks on the MET-ID 
would correlate with better performance on the TOLT therefore requires 
examination. 
Shallice and Burgess (1991) suggested that performance on the MET 
requires use of the SAS to provide (a) goal articulation, (b) provisional plan 
formulation, (c) the creation of a mental ‘marker’ to schedule a delayed 
intention, (d) triggering of the marker (by an appropriate mental or physical 
event) and (e) a continual evaluation process that can lead to the 
development of subgoals to be achieved if the present circumstances prove 
to be unsatisfactory. In considering the more recent and detailed 
specifications of the SAS (Shallice, 2002; Shallice & Burgess 1996), its 
component processes have been fractionated into eight functions including 
spontaneous schema generation (implicitly knowing what to do), goal setting, 
adoption of processing mode (problem solving), episodic memory retrieval 
(drawing upon memory from past experiences), delayed intention marker 
realisation (remembering to do something in the future), working memory, 
monitoring and rejection of schema (Burgess & Alderman, 2004). Drawing 
upon this model it is possible to see how ability to initiate tasks on the MET 
could be attributed to the spontaneous schema generation (being able to 
implicitly develop a plan to achieve the task), goal setting (being able to 
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adequately set oneself the goal of achieving a set task), adoption of 
processing mode (being able to problem solve any difficulties that may arise) 
and delayed intention marker realisation (being able to remember to go back 
to tasks that cannot be completed straight away) functions of the SAS. 
Accordingly, it is useful to understand how abilities in these areas would 
correlate with performance on the TOLT.  
Aside from being a measure of “planning” (Shallice, 1982) the TOLT 
has also been conceptualised as a measure of goal-conflict resolution 
(Morris, Miotto, Feigenbaum, Bullock, & Polkey, 1997). For example, on the 
TOLT the participant has to consider a number of moves that will bring their 
disc arrangement closer to the required end state. Because it would place a 
high cognitive demand on working memory to calculate all possible 
sequences one must go through to get from the starting arrangement to the 
goal state, the participant must engage in a number of problem solving 
processes. Simon (1975) describes one of the most efficient strategies as 
being to divide the task into smaller subgoals and progressively move 
through the subgoals accordingly. Goal-subgoal conflict occurs when one 
has to make a move that, whilst needed to bring the discs to the required end 
state, necessitates that the participant makes a move that appears to take 
them away from the end goal state. Several examples of such moves are 
present on the TOLT used in this study (see Masson et al., 2010). 
Accordingly, successful performance on the TOLT could be explained via 
abilities in spontaneous schema generation (being able to implicitly develop 
a plan to make a correct move in the face of goal-subgoal conflict), goal 
setting (being able to develop effective sub-goals in order to bring them 
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closer to the desired end state in the face of goal-subgoal conflict) and 
adoption of processing mode (being able to problem solve any difficulties 
that may arise the face of goal-subgoal conflict). 
Thus, with the exception of delayed intention marker realisation, there 
is a correspondence in the spontaneous schema generation, goal setting and 
adoption of processing mode functions of the SAS that could plausibly 
explain the relationship between these two measures. It is these components 
of the SAS that could potentially be impaired in those unable to complete 
tasks on the MET-ID and performing poorly on the TOLT. 
Alternately, a more parsimonious explanation could be found in 
Duncan’s theory of goal neglect (Duncan, 1986, 1995; Duncan et al., 1995, 
1996, 1997, 2008). As outlined above, this theory is based upon the 
importance of goal setting in human behaviour and how, in order to achieve 
set goals they must be divided into specific subgoals. Duncan suggests that 
people with executive difficulties tend to neglect such goals despite being 
aware of them. As both the MET-ID and the TOLT have the potential for goal 
neglect to be exposed (e.g., on the MET-ID via failing/neglecting tasks and 
on the TOLT via repeatedly breaking rules despite immediate verbal 
feedback from the examiner after each rule break), it is therefore plausible 
that failing to complete task on the MET-ID and poor performance on the 
TOLT could alternately be attributed to a neglect of specific goals. This 
interpretation is tentative however based on the fact that Duncan et al. 
(1996) define goal neglect as “the disregard of a task requirement even 
though it has been understood and remembered” (p. 257). Thus, firm 
conclusions based on this theory are limited because it is unclear as to the 
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extent to which, at least on the MET-ID, task requirements were understood 
and remembered (based on the correlations between the MET-ID scales and 
receptive vocabulary, reading ability and VIQ, and the finding that 
participants found it difficult to remember and recall the rules).  
 
4.7 Clinical implications 
 
The clinical implications for this study can be divided into those related 





Newer neuropsychological assessments that can demonstrate 
ecological validity are needed and this is no exception for the development of 
executive function measures for people with ID (Burgess et al., 2006; 
Masson et al., 2010). Indeed, most current standard measures of executive 
function are typically too complex or rely too heavily on verbal skills for 
people with ID, resulting in floor effects (Masson et al., 2010). Accordingly, 
this study has shown that the use of auditory equipment can help circumvent 
some of the difficulties faced in accessing measures of EF for people with ID, 
where typically the verbal demands of the measures are too complex. As it 
stands, the MET-ID still needs further development, however this study has 
demonstrated that EF can be assessed outside of traditional office settings in 
people with ID and thus afford a richer formulation of how an individual’s EF 
may play out in their everyday life. These considerations should be taken into 
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account for the future development of measures of executive function in 




Ultimately, this study is about the assessment of executive function 
and therefore it is recognised that generalisations about the way in which 
such assessment may guide interventions may be vulnerable to inferences 
that are not substantiated by the data reported here. Nevertheless, the 
theoretical implications of the findings lead onto a number of potential clinical 
implications that are worthy of note. Based on the SAS model, Shallice and 
Burgess (1996) suggest that, if spontaneous schema generation fails to 
occur, the adoption of processing mode function (e.g., problem solving) can 
be used to devise an appropriate plan. They describe this as a process of 
problem formulation and orientation (where goal setting occurs), the 
deepening of a solving attempt, assessing if a solution is effective and finally 
a return to the first phase for checking and recapitulation. Thus, deficits in 
schema generation, goal setting and problem solving would lend themselves 
to interventions that explicitly address problem solving deficits. Accordingly, 
Problem Solving Therapy (PST; D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2007) attempts to address 
four major problem solving skills including (a) problem definition and 
formulation, (b) generation of alternative solutions, (c) decision making and 
(d) solution implementation and verification. Interventions based on this 
model have been shown to be effective at improving executive function in 
participants with brain injuries (Rath, Simon, Langenbahn, Sherr, & Diller, 
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2003; von Cramon, Matthes-von Cramon, & Mai, 1991). Accordingly, based 
on evidence that the application of problem solving therapy to difficulties 
faced in the social domain have been effective in people with ID (Lindsay, et 
al., 2011; Loumidis & Hill, 1997), it is conceivable that such a therapy may be 
successfully adapted for treating executive deficits in people with ID.  
Alternately, as outlined above, Duncan’s theory of goal neglect has 
stimulated the development of GMT (Levine et al., 2000), which shares 
strong parallels with PST. Here GMT uses similar techniques to aid the 
participant in overcoming executive problems by getting them to (a) stop, (b) 
define what is to be done, (c) list the steps needed to do it, (d) learn the 
steps and (e) check it. This approach has also demonstrated promising 
results in people with brain injuries (Levine et al., 2000) and therefore may 
also offer useful implications for therapies designed to remediate executive 
impairments in people with ID. 
 Equally, there is also growing evidence that the MET can be a useful  
rehabilitation tool for improving executive difficulties in its own right, or at 
least in teaching people the use of coping strategies to foster improved MET 
performance (Alderman & Baker, 2009; Rand et al., 2009). Further research 
may substantiate the degree to which such training would generalise onto 
other real world executive tasks to investigate whether training on the MET-
ID may be an additional potential means of improving cognitive skills in 
people with ID. Alternately, the MET-ID may serve as a useful means of 




4.8 Overall conclusion 
 
The research hypotheses proposed in this study were not supported 
by the data as the MET-ID failed to correlate well with measures that purport 
to assess executive function deficits in real life. Moreover, MET-ID 
performance was strongly related to receptive vocabulary, reading 
comprehension and general verbal abilities. This limits the extent to which 
this preliminary version of the MET-ID can be generalised as an ecologically 
valid and specific assessment of executive function in people with ID. Thus, 
the MET-ID will need further development to make it a more accessible and 
psychometrically sound measure for an ID population. However, the MET-ID 
did share a robust relationship with the TOLT. This suggests that the two 
tasks may have a specific executive process (or set of executive processes) 
in common which can be attributed to the spontaneous schema generation, 
goal setting and adoption of processing mode (problem solving) functions of 
the SAS. Whist further research is needed, this suggests that specific 
interventions such as PST or GMT may prove fruitful at helping people with 
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In this exercise you should complete the following three tasks: 
1) You should do the following 6 things: 
 Collect something for the examiner from Main Reception and do what is 
necessary 
 Buy 4 1st class stamps 
 Buy a get well card 
 Buy a can of Coca-Cola 
 Telephone Kemsley Reception and say where you are, who you are, and 
what time it is 
 Post something to Caroline Knight in Birmingham 
 
2)You should obtain the following information and write it down in 
the spaces below: 
1. What is the closing time of the staff library on a Friday?           
 
2. What is the opening time of the hospital shop on a Saturday? 
 
3. What is the price of a Mars Bar? 
 
4. How many public carparks are there in the hospital grounds (not including 
staff or disabled only parking)? 
 
3)You must meet me outside Main Reception 20 minutes after 
you have started the task and tell me the time 
 
TELL THE PERSON OBSERVING YOU WHEN YOU HAVE 
COMPLETED THE EXERCISE 
 
Whilst carrying out this exercise you must obey the following 
rules: 
 You must carry out all these tasks but may do so in any order 
 You should spend no more than £2.50 
 You should stay within the limits of the hospital grounds 
 You should not enter any of the hospital wards or “staff only” areas 
 No building should be entered other than to complete part of the task 
inside 
 You should not go back into a building you have already been in 
 You should buy no more than 2 items in the hospital shop 
 Take as little time to complete this exercise without rushing excessively 
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 Do not speak to the person observing you unless this is part of the 
exercise 
 
Your examiner was: 
Caroline Knight 
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Information sheet ID sample (Version 2 – 11.11.2010) 
 
Development of a new test of multitasking 
 
Who are the researchers?         
- Tom Steverson 
- Dr Peter Langdon 
- Dr Anna Adlam 
       
 
What is it about? 
- Some people have difficulties doing lots of different things at 
the same time.  
- We are trying to find out how this might affect the daily lives 
of people with learning difficulties to find better ways of 
helping them in their daily lives. 
- The NHS Norfolk Research and Development department 
and the Cambridgeshire 4 Research Ethics Committee (ref 







Do I have to take part in this research? 
- No, it’s up to you if you want to take part. If you don’t want 
to take part this will not affect your care at the day centre or 
any treatment you receive from the NHS or social services. 
- If you say YES, Tom will come and speak to you and 
answer any questions you might have. 
- If you want to take part, he will ask you to do some puzzles 
and quizzes. 
- He will also ask a member of staff to complete a 
questionnaire about you. However, he will make sure you 




How long will it all take? 
- About one hour on two different days. 
- I will make sure that it does not interfere with your daily 
activities.  
 
Will my information be kept secret? 
- Yes, the information will be kept under lock and key and 
treated as confidential under the data protection act (1998). 
- I will write about the information I have collected but I will 
make sure that there are no personal details about you. 
 
 
Are there any bad things that could happen? 
- No 
- Some of the tasks might be a little difficult, but they are 
designed to be like that. 
- If you are upset in any way, you can stop the tasks and talk 
to Tom or someone else. 
 
What if I am unhappy about the research? 
- You can stop at any point during the study and tell Tom that 
you no longer wish to take part. 






- You can talk to Tom or someone you know about it. 
- You can make a complaint to the University of East Anglia 
or the NHS. 
- You will be given information on how to complain. 
- You may want someone you know to help you with this. 
- If you are harmed, you may be able to take legal action - if 
this is caused by the study. 
- If you harm yourself in a way that is not caused by taking 





- If you want more information or wish to complain, you or 
your key worker can call UEA (01603 593310, Monday to 
Friday) and ask to speak to: 
 
Tom Steverson or 
Dr Peter Langdon (Clinical Psychologist) or 
Dr Anna Adlam (Clinical Psychologist). 
 
- Or write to any of these people at: 
 
School of Medicine, Health Policy and Practice 
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Informed consent from ID sample (Version 2 – 11.11.2010) 
 
Would you like a carer/key worker to be present? 
 
Please tick the box if you agree with the sentence: 
 
I understand the information sheet for this study explained 
to me by  .............................................................. 
 
I have asked any questions I have wanted to.  
I understand that I don’t have to take part in this research 
and I can leave at any time without giving a reason. 
 
I understand that it will not affect my care at the day centre if 
I choose not to take part. 
 
I understand that all information collected about me is 
confidential. 
 
I am happy for the staff to complete a questionnaire about 
me and I have seen this questionnaire. 
 
I agree to take part in the research.  




Name of Participant     
 
Signature      
 






Name of Researcher     
 
Signature      
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Demographic data collection sheet ID sample (Version 1 – 
06.10.2010) 
 
Participant identification number      
 
Gender          
 
1. What is your date of birth? 
 
2. Have you ever had a head injury or been diagnosed with dementia or 
schizophrenia? 
 
3. Are you currently taking part in other research? 
 
4. How well do you know the day centre on a scale of 0-4 (0 = not very 
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Information sheet staff version (Version 2 – 11.11.2010) 
 
Development of a new test to examine multitasking 
 
Who are the researchers? 
- Tom Steverson 
- Dr Peter Langdon 
- Dr Anna Adlam 
 
What is it about? 
- Some people with learning difficulties might have problems 
multitasking.  
- We are trying to find out how this might affect the daily lives 
of people with learning difficulties by asking staff to fill out a 
20 item questionnaire about a service user at the day 
centre. 
- We hope that the work will help provide better ways of 
helping people with learning difficulties in their daily lives. 
- The study has been reviewed and given favourable opinions 
by Cambridgeshire 4 Research Ethics Committee (ref 
number 10/H0305/75) and the NHS Norfolk Research and 
Development department. 
 
Do I have to take part in this research? 
- No, it’s up to you if you want to take part or not. 
- If you agree, I will ask you to fill out a questionnaire about 
one of the service users at the day centre. 
- The service user will have agreed to take part in the 
research and given consent to being rated on the 




How long will it all take? 
- The questionnaire has only 20 questions so the whole 
process should only take about 10 minutes. 
 
Is the information I give confidential? 
- Yes, all data is anonymised and the service user will not be 
able to see the answers you give. 
- The information will be kept under lock and key and treated 
as confidential under that data protection act (1998). 
- I will write up the information I have collected in my research 
but I will make sure that there are no personal details about 
you. 
 
What if I am unhappy about the research? 
- You can stop at any point during the study and withdraw 
your participation.  
- Any information you gave will then be destroyed. 
 
If you remain unhappy about the research 
- You can make a complaint to the University of East Anglia 
or the NHS. 
- You will be given information on how to complain. 
- If you are harmed, you may be able to take legal action. 
 
Contacts 
- If you want more information or wish to complain, you can 
call UEA (01603 593310, Monday to Friday) and ask to 
speak to: 
 
Tom Steverson or 
Dr Peter Langdon (Clinical Psychologist) or 
Dr Anna Adlam (Clinical Psychologist). 
 
- Or write to either of these people at: 
 
School of Medicine, Health Policy and Practice 













                        University of East Anglia 
                                     
                                       Norwich NR4 7TJ England 
                                       
                                                  Telephone 
                                    01603 593310 
 
                                                       Fax 
                                    01603 591132 
 
                                                       Email 
t.steverson@uea.ac.uk                                              
 







Informed consent form staff version (Version 2 – 11.11.2010) 
 
Please tick the box if you agree with the sentence: 
 
I understand the information sheet for this study explained 
to me by Tom Steverson. 
 
I have asked any questions I have wanted to.  
I understand that I don’t have to take part in this research 
and I can leave at any time without giving a reason. 
 
I understand that all information I give is confidential.  
I agree to take part in the research.  




Name of Participant     
 
Signature      
 
Date       
 
 
Name of Researcher     
 
Signature      
 















































Do the green, blue and red tasks: 
 
1) Do these 3 things: 
 Find a book and give it to Tom    
 Ask for an envelope from reception and give  
it to Tom when you have finished 
 
 Find a pencil and give it to a member of staff     
 
 
2) Tell Tom the answers to these questions: 
 
 How many clocks are there at the day centre?   
 
 What is one of today’s activities?    
 What is today’s date and month?    
 






TELL TOM WHEN YOU HAVE FINSISHED 
 
Rules 
 Do ALL the tasks, but in ANY order  
 DON’T go back into a room you’ve already   
 
been in  
 DON’T leave the DAY CENTRE   
 
 DON’T enter any STAFF OFFICES   
 
 DON’T carry more than ONE THING   
 
 DON’T RUSH   
 









Do the green tasks: 
 
- Find a book and give it to Tom.    
- Ask for a piece of paper from reception and  
  put it on a chair.  
 
- Find an empty cup and give it to Tom.  
- Clap your hands together 3 minutes after you start.  
 

















Follow the red rules: 
 
 Do ALL the tasks in ANY order.  
 
 DON’T speak to Tom unless it’s to tell him  
 
when you’ve finished. 
 
 DON’T walk inside the RECEPTION.   
 
 DON’T walk inside any STAFF OFFICES.  
 
 
 DON’T go back into a room you’ve already  
 
been in.  
 DON’T leave the DAY CENTRE.  
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Appendix K - MET- ID Administration Instructions 
 
 
Ensure that there is paper at reception and that books, cups and pencils are 
freely available at the day centre. 
 
In the testing room, give the participant the clipboard with the attached 
exercise sheet, recorder pen and (if the participant does not have one 
already) a watch. Then read the following instructions to the participant: 
 
In this next task we will be walking around the day centre and I want you to 
do these green tasks. I will tell you about these green tasks, but you can also 
hear them read out by touching the sticker next the words with this pen 
(show participant pen and how to activate the instructions in auditory form). 
 
The green tasks are to do the things listed here (examiner to play the rule 
with the recorder pen and then describe the rule as below). 
 
Find a book and give it to me. 
 
Ask for a piece of paper from reception and put it on a chair. 
 
Find an empty cup and give it to me. 
 
Clap your hands together three minutes after you start. You have a watch to 
help you with this. 
 
Find a pencil and put it on a table. 
 
Finally, tell me when you have finished. 
 
However, while do these green tasks you must obey these red rules 
(examiner to play the rules with recorder pen and then describe the rules as 
below). 
 
You must carry out all the tasks but you may do so in any order. 
 
This means you shouldn’t speak to me unless you are telling me when you 
have finished. 
 
You must not walk inside the reception. You need to speak to someone from 
reception for one of the tasks, but don’t walk inside it.  
 
You must not walk inside any staff offices. 
 
Don’t go back into a room you have already been in. This means that if you 
have been into a room, you cannot go back into it again. However, you can 
go into the ... and the... as many times as you like (depending upon the 
design of the day centre there may be certain areas where this is necessary 




Don’t leave the day centre. This means you must not leave by any of the 
entrances or exits.  
 
I now want to give you to try and learn these rules. I will then ask you to tell 
me as many as you can. Don’t worry it’s not a test. I just want to make sure 
that you know the rules. You can use the pen to help you. I will help you 
remember them afterwards if you get stuck. (Make sure the participant plays 
through all the rules at least twice. Record the number of rules recalled 
immediately on the sheet. When the participant cannot remember any more, 




Move to the area by the front door of the day centre. Give the participant the 
practice exercise sheet and rules.  
 
Let’s do a practice. Look at these tasks here. Can you get the pen to read 
them out?  
 
OK, so now you must do what it says, so find a chair and sit on it. Give 
participant help as necessary and point out any rule breaks. 
 
Find a window and touch it. Give participant help as necessary and point out 
any rule breaks.  
 
Repeat these steps once more giving appropriate encouragement and 
reinforcement for correct responses.  
 
OK so now you know what to do. Remove practice sheet and reveal exercise 
sheet. Now you need to do these tasks but not break any of the rules. 
(Clarify that participant understands what they must do and go over tasks 
and rules again if necessary).  
 
During the exercise I will be following you and watching what you are doing. I 
can’t give you any help from now onwards so please do not speak to me 
unless you are telling me when you have finished. 
 
Begin the exercise (Assessor to start timing at this point) 
 
If participant asks a question during the exercise state remember one of the 
rules is not to speak to me, but you must to do all these tasks (point at board) 
and not break the rules (point at board). 
 
If at any point during the test the participant continually scrolls through the 
tasks/rules with the recorder pen more than two times without actually 
initiating any of the tasks state, remember one of the rules is not to speak 
to me, but you must to do all the tasks (point at board) and not break the 




Discontinue rule:  
 
When the participant says “I’ve finished” the test is completed, irrespective of 
how many/few of the tasks they have done. 
 
If the participant does not say “I’ve finished”, but is clearly not going to do 
any (more) of the tasks, use the prompt. If the participant still fails to initiate 













































Appendix L - MET-ID Rule Recall Response Sheet 






















Cued Rule Recall 
Yes/No 
Do all the tasks, but in any 
order. 
 There was a rule about 
Carrying out the tasks 
Do you remember what the 
rule was? 
 
Don’t speak to Tom unless it’s 
to tell him when you’ve 
finished. 
 There was a rule about 
Speaking to Tom 
Do you remember what the 
rule was? 
 
Don’t walk inside the reception   There was a rule about 
The reception 
Do you remember what the 
rule was? 
 
Don’t walk inside any staff 
offices.  
 There was a rule about 
Staff offices 
Do you remember what the 
rule was? 
 
Don’t go back into a room 
you’ve already been in. 
 There was a rule about 
Going back into a room 
you have already been in 




Don’t leave the day centre.  There was a rule about 
Leaving the day centre 









Do the green tasks: 
 
- Find a chair and sit on it.  
 
 



































Practice tasks completed fine 
 
00:00 Reading tasks in hall 
 
00:22 Walks over to shelf in hall. Gives examiner leaflet. 
 
01:05 Walks over to reception. Walks inside reception. 
Appears to believe that she is not allowed to talk 
to staff. Whispers “paper” to staff. 
 
  Staff member gives paper to participant. 
 
  Participant puts paper on chair in reception. 
 
02:29 Walks into kitchen. 
 
  Gives examiner and empty cup. 
 
03:09 Claps hands together. 
 
03:44 Walks into recreation area. 
 
04:07 Walking around recreation area. 
 




Appendix O - MET-ID Scoring Sheet 
 
Participant ID:  Date of testing:   Rater: 
 
Effort category Example Yes? 
Task attempts  
-Where a task is 
attempted but not 
completed satisfactorily. 
- If the task is also 
completed satisfactorily 
then a point is still 
awarded for the attempt. 
- Award one point per 
task attempt. 
 Found a book (award point even if 
participant finds alternate relevant 
item e.g., magazine, leaflet, 
brochure, newspaper etc). 
 
 Asked for a piece of paper from 
reception (award point even if 
participant fails to put item on 
chair). 
 
 Found an empty cup (award point 
even if participant finds a cup but 
fails to give it to examiner, if the 
cup has liquid in or if alternate 
relevant item e.g., glass). 
 
 Clapped hands together (award 
point even if clap is too early [<two 
minutes] or too late [>four 
minutes]). 
 
 Found a pencil (award point even if 
participant uses a pen/marker or 
gets pencil but fails to put it on a 
table). 
 
 Told examiner when finished 
(award point even if participant 
indicates they have finished without 
prompting but fails to explicitly say 
“finished”). 
 
















Error category Example Yes? 
Rule breaks  
-Where a specific rule 
was broken. 
- Award one point per 
rule break. 
 Failed to attempt all six tasks 
(award if total task attempts score is 
five or less) 
 
 Spoke to examiner other than to say 
when they had finished (includes 
reading out tasks) 
 
 Entered reception  
 Entered staff office (not reception)  
 Re-entered side room (re-entering 
the hall/foyer and/or recreation area 
is OK) 
 
 Exited day centre  




































Effort category Example Yes? 
Task completions  
-Where a task is 
attempted and 
completed satisfactorily. 
- Award one point per 
task completion. 
 Found book and gave it to 
examiner (not completed 
satisfactorily if item was not a book 
e.g., item was a magazine or 
brochure or does not give it to 
examiner) 
 
 Got a piece of paper from reception 
and put it on a chair (not completed 
satisfactorily if paper was not put 
on a chair or put a table/floor etc) 
 
 Found an empty cup and gave it to 
examiner (not completed 
satisfactorily if cup is not given to 
examiner, has liquid in it or relevant 
item given is not a cup e.g., a 
glass). 
 
 Clapped hands three minutes after 
starting (not completed 
satisfactorily if participant claps 
hand too early [<two minutes] or 
too late [>four minutes]). 
 
 Found a pencil and put it on a table 
(not completed satisfactorily if 
participant uses a pen/marker 
rather than a pencil or puts it 
somewhere other than a table). 
 
 Told examiner when finished (not 
completed satisfactorily if states 
something like “I’m ready to go 
back to the room now” rather than 
specifically using the word 
“finished”). 
 






















N Valid 40 40 40 
Missing 0 0 0 
Skewness -.829 -.052 .204 
Std. Error of Skewness .374 .374 .374 
Kurtosis -.740 -.736 -1.159 











N Valid 40 40 40 40 
Missing 0 0 0 0 
Skewness .660 .193 -.154 .058 
Std. Error of Skewness .374 .374 .374 .374 
Kurtosis .747 -.793 -1.377 -1.107 








N Valid 40 40 
Missing 0 0 
Skewness 1.132 -.299 
Std. Error of Skewness .374 .374 
Kurtosis .583 -.295 










Appendix R - Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests for each 
Measure 
 





Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
MET-ID task attempts .248 40 .000 .826 40 .000 
MET-ID rule breaks .225 40 .000 .849 40 .000 
MET-ID task completions .193 40 .001 .913 40 .005 
DEX Total .109 40 .200
*
 .961 40 .185 
SPT total score .114 40 .200
*
 .964 40 .228 
TOLT total points score .191 40 .001 .914 40 .005 




 .955 40 .111 
BPVS raw score .105 40 .200
*
 .965 40 .254 
WASI FSIQ .198 40 .000 .883 40 .001 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
*. This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
 
 
 
